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This thesis investigates the applicability and results of a Bayesian 
approach used to forecast the h ture  direction of the Cuban economy. 
The Castro regime, bound to a stagnant political ideology, has limited 
the options by which to save socialism and the revolution. This study 
first examines the historical, political and economic contexts that 
define the decision environment and then proceeds to formalize 
hypotheses, target variables and relevant events indicative of Cuba's 
economic direction. The qualification of the Cuban economy as either 
a centrally planned economy, a mixed economy or a predominantly 
market economy leads to forecast scenarios that create a framework 
upon which to apply Bayesian techniques. The results of the Bayesian 
forecast and sensitivity analysis support three major conclusions: 1 ) 
Bayesian analysis is an adroit methodology by which to explicitly 
determine the probabilities of Cuba's economic direction: 2) Cuba's 
economic direction, given recent efforts and initiatives, favors either a 
mixed or market economy; and 3) in contrast to the resurrection of 
the institutions of the Cuban revolution, the advancement of Cuba's 
economic recovery will warrant a predominantly market economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSEAND OBJECTIVES 
The economic reforms currently taking place in Cuba merit close 
examination as the future of the Cuban economy may very well shape its 
political future. The collapse of the former Soviet Union has devastated the 
Cuban economy and has forced Fidel Castro to seek alternative means by 
which to save socialism and the revolution. Castro has vowed never to 
embrace capitalism, yet he realizes the need to move away from a centrally 
planned economy. Unlike the leaders of the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, who are experiencing dissimilar economic motivations, 
Castro remains vehemently opposed to making a complete transition to a 
market economy. Thus far the Castro regime has chosen to implement both 
economic and political reforms incrementally, largely in response to  
worsening conditions. Externally, Cuba continues to court foreign 
investment with limited success. Many Cuban analysts believe these efforts 
are inadequate because they prolong popular suffering and serve only to 
temporarily delay economic collapse. There is a strong consensus that 
unless the Castro regime proceeds along the most direct path to a market 
economy, the Cuban economy is doomed to meander aimlessly. 
The economic crisis in Cuba is deepening and has already begun 
deteriorating the social gains of the revolution. The Cuban economy faces a 
precarious paradox. Fidel Castro can no longer depend on Soviet subsidy 
and must now seek immediate means to generate hard currency, however, 
the options available to Cuba are limited by a stagnant political ideology. The 
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current economic priorities of the Castro regime became apparent after the 
meeting of the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, held in 
October 1991; they serve to define the desired terminal state of the Cuban 
economy for this study. The priorities are: 
1. to earn hard currency via joint ventures and exports 
2. to achieve foodstuff self-sufficiency 
3. to pursue alternative sources of energy 
4. to maintain political control of the economy, and 
5. to ensure Cuba's survival despite the U.S. embargo. 
Each of these initiatives is a response to Cuba's economic isolation, and the 
future direction of the Cuban economy will internally depend upon their 
attainment. Even though the abandonment of socialist economic ideals 
seems inevitable, there exists acritical period of transition for Cuba. It is 
during this period that Castro's decisions and their impact upon selected 
target variables can be assessed and the associated probabilities of economic 
direction charted. 
The future direction of the Cuban economy and the extent of its 
recovery may be gleaned by employing the fundamental ideas of decision 
theory combined with Bayesian analytical methods. The purpose of this 
thesis is to examine the potential for using a Bayesian approach in making a 
forecast of the direction of the Cuban economy in the short (1-2 years) to 
medium (3-5 years) term. Much of the recent literature dedicated to Cuba's 
"life after the Soviet Union" addresses strategies of economic reform and 
reconstruction or presents political and economic scenarios possible in the 
near term, whereupon possible hture scenarios implicitly imply the 
direction of the Cuban economy. The purpose of this study will be to 
explicitly determine the probabilities of Cuba sustaining a centrally planned 
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economy or transitioning to a mixed or predominantly market economy 
based upon the conditional dependence of specific variables: foreign 
exchange earnings, import substitution, political control, economic reforms, 
integration into the international finance community, and the policies of 
international or regional actors. Armed with such probabilistic outcomes, a 
forecast of Cuba's economic direction can be proposed given an observed 
sequence of events. 
The results of this study will avoid political and ideological judgment 
of Fidel Castro's reforms and the debate over the U.S. trade embargo. 
Although this may be the likeliest of times for the Castro regime to come to 
an end, the relevance of this study may transcend into the longer term if the 
view expressed by the distinguished Cuban expert Jorge Dominguez is 
correct: 
In the long run, the free market transition will lay the 
foundation of Cuba's future, no matter who rules the nation or 
what form the government takes [Ref. 1: p. 1011. 
B. ORGANIZATION AND APPROACH 
According to Adolf Lowe, the aim of a socialist economy in transition is 
a terminal state (of nature) with an efficient use of resources and a higher 
rate of growth, and not necessarily the marketization and privatization of the 
economy. The challenge in analyzing the transformation of centrally 
planned economies via this approach is to establish the ends-means 
relationship accurately. The terminal state is defined in terms of specified 
macroeconomic goals and institutional changes instrumental to their 
achievement. What remains to be determined is whether the envisioned 
institutional structure creates the necessary motivations to move the 
economy to the desired terminal state [Ref. 2: p. 611. 
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Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides both the historical 
context and current appraisal of the Cuban economy from which the 
underlying assumptions governing the analytical framework of the study are 
drawn. Examined are the political and economic impact of past economic 
reforms, the nature of the Cuban economy taken against the socialist 
backdrop of centrally planned economies and the economic challenges 
ahead. Chapter 3 discusses the political considerations used to define the 
decision making environment, as well as the major economic sectors within 
the cuban economy and the significance of these sectors with respect to 
Cuba achieving the terminal state desired by Fidel Castro. The integration 
of the previous three chapters sets the initial conditions, target variables 
and formalizes the forecast mechanics that are presented in Chapter 4. 
Finally, conclusions drawn from the forecasts and their implications 
regarding economic direction and recovery are presented in Chapter 5. 
Contained within Appendices A and B are a brief introduction to Bayes’ 
theorem and a numerical example using hierarchical inference to calculate 
the assigned probabilities of relevant events. 
An econometric approach, although feasible, may prove too complex 
and cumbersome in assessing a generalized sense of economic heading: 
considering the difficulty of establishing, mathematically, production 
functions without reliable data and the crisis mode in which the Cuban 
economy is currently operating. A time-series model, which extrapolates 
past economic trends into the future, usually occurs in cases where a large 
number of data points are available [Ref. 3: pp. xii-xv]. In the case of Cuba, 
this approach encounters three major obstacles. First, the data points must 
be accurately translated from their original socialist accounting context (the 
Material Product System, systemic to the countries of the former Soviet 
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trade bloc) where price setting is fundamentally different from that in 
market economies. Second, historic macroeconomic data is either 
unavailable or significantly skewed by the magnitude of past Soviet subsidy so 
as to decrease the confidence level collectively assigned to the data points. 
Third, economic trends exhibited by a Soviet-dependent Cuba cannot be 
unconditionally extrapolated and applied to a post-cold war Cuba where the 
Soviet Union no longer exists. 
A single-equation regression model attempts to explain the variable 
under study by a single, often time-dependent, function (linear or non- 
linear) of explanatory variables [Ref. 3: p. xiv]. The previous work of Alonso 
and Lago provide such an "approximation" model assuming a post-Castro 
democratic Cuba.' Similarly, a multi-equation simulation model seeks to 
relate the explanatory variables, through a set of equations, not only to the 
variable under study, but to each other as well. Both of these approaches 
requires a thorough understanding of the economic interrelationships and 
processes being studied, and consequently, the construction of such models 
may prove extremely difficult [Ref. 3: pp. xiv-xv]. The dynamics of the Cuban 
economic crisis force a collateral reevaluation of the processes at work and 
thereby compound the necessary mathematical formulations. Pursuant to 
the obstacles expressed thus far, a Bayesian forecast appears to be an 
applicable, appealing alternative: even though no similar application of the 
methodology was discovered upon reviewing the literature. 
Bayed theorem provides a formal procedure for revising the 
probability assessments of hypotheses concerning a situation such that 
evidence upon which the revisions are based is (1)  more systematically 
See Jose F. Alonso and Armando M. Lago, "A First Approximation Model of the 
Balance of Payments, Output, Employment and Foreign Aid Requirements of a 
Democratic Cuba (Washington, D.C. : ASCE, 1993). 
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considered than it would be intuitively and (2) is given more weight than if 
it were intuitively aggregated and judged. Thus more information can be 
extracted from the available data because the technique allows each piece of 
evidence, whether central or marginal, to add its weight to the final 
assessment in a systematic way. [Ref. 4: p. xiv] In some cases the observed 
data cannot be directly related to a given hypothesis, but instead is 
interrelated with an intermediate variable within a hierarchical structure. 
Hierarchical inference serves to decompose a complex relationship by using 
such a hierarchical structure. I t  may be easier to first assess those 
probabilities linking the data to the intermediate variables (events or 
evidence indicative of events) relevant to the hypothesis and then assess the 
probabilities linking the intennediate variables to the hypothesis. [Ref. 5: p. 
1171 Bayesian analysis calls for all probability assessments to be subjective 
and therefore risks reflection of undue bias or genuine disagreement among 
analysts. Bayesian techniques seek to overcome these shortfalls by assigning 
a formal role to subjective (non-data) information, allowing the forecaster t o  
evaluate the impact of such information on the conclusions via a sensitivity 
analysis. 
Theorizing that the Cuban economy can be qualified as either a 
centrally planned economy, a mixed economy or a predominantly market 
economy, specifies a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
possible outcomes that constitute the hypothesis under analysis. Following 
the tenets of decision theory and Bayesian analysis the following approach 
results: (1) each of the possible outcomes is subjectively assigned a 
probability of occurrence; (2) considered next are events and/or evidence 
that would support the aforementioned outcomes; (3) the indicators related 
to these events and/or evidence are identified; (4) quantitative linkages 
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(conditional probabilities) are established between adjacent -levels based 
upon existing knowledge or information and hierarchical inference, as 
dictated by the fundamental principles of decision theory; (5) lastly, as new 
events occur or evidence is received, the use of Bayes' theorem leads to the 
revision of the original probabilities assigned. [Ref. 41 
As a result of the Bayesian forecast, a graphical representation of the 
initial and revised probabilities of the hypotheses will be used to illustrate 
the overall trends of the Cuban economy as relevant events occur. In 
addition, a sensitivity analysis of the forecast will be performed by 
substituting high and low values into various probability assessments and re- 
calculating the hypotheses, outcome probabilities, thereby providing a range 
and an idea of the relative sensitivities involved [Ref. 5: pp. 100-1011. The 
originally assigned probabilities can also be adjusted in response to changing 
political or economic events and the forecast revised to reflect other 
probabilistic scenarios. Expanding or refining the possible outcomes or  
variables under consideration will warrant further study. 
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II. RACKGROUND 
A HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Over the past three decades, Cuba has experienced a geopolitical 
demise moving from being a world actor in Africa and the Middle East; 
to a regional actor in El Salvador and Nicaragua; to ultimately 
becoming a small state struggling to survive economically [Ref. 6: p. 
22). Upon reviewing the recent history of the Cuban economy, two 
periods are essential in tracing the events leading up to the current 
Cuban economic crisis--Cuban-Soviet economic relations since 1960 
and the three major economic reforms undertaken by the Castro 
regime beginning in 1980. A positive constant in Cuban development 
strategies has been the emphasis on social concerns of the revolution 
such as full employment, equitable distribution and access to health 
and education services. Performance in the economic goals of growth 
diversification, and external economic independence have been less 
satisfactory [Ref. 7: pp. 38, 411. A turbulent environment for change 
has resulted from Castro's strong desire to preserve Cuban socialism 
and the increasing economic pressures to establish the conditions for 
production within the Cuban economy. 
The Cuban economy examined within its historical context 
provides valuable insight into the motivations of Fidel Castro and his 
economic policies. The magnitude and extent of past Soviet assistance 
represents the subsidy required to perpetuate the Cuban economy. 
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Consequently, the termination of Soviet aid has exposed critical 
sectors of the Cuban economy that demand new development 
strategies. The results of past economic reforms reveal an assessment 
of success and failure by the Castro regime, which may similarly 
influence hture economic decisions. 
1. Cuban-Soviet Relations: 1960-1990 
Since the early 1960s the central reality of the Cuban economy 
has been its dependence upon Soviet aid. which became the island’s 
economic lifeline. For over thirty years, Soviet economic assistance 
also allowed Fidel Castro to pursue and subsequently fund the social 
aims of the revolution, thereby representing an ideological partnership 
as well. Soviet economic assistance to Cuba, which totaled between 
$3.7-$4.8 billion dollars per year.2 came in direct balance of payments 
and project aid as well as in price subsidies for Cuba’s imports and 
exports. 
Beginning in the 1980’s. Cuba increased its foreign exchange by 
importing substantial volumes of sugar from the world market at 
depressed world market prices in hard currency for re-export to the 
Soviet Union at preferential prices in soft currency. Cuba used the soft 
currency revenue to buy Soviet oil that was then re-exported to 
western Europe for dollars [Ref. 8: p. 1201. These deals resulted in 
substantial hard currency gains for Cuba. Soviet oil and sugar subsidies 
were close to 20 percent of the Cuban GDP during several years of 
rapid growth in the early eighties [Ref. 8, 61. Economic pressures 
According to Soviet Politburo member, Yuri Maslyukov, the differences arise from the use of different 
exchange rates to convert rubles to dollars. 
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within the Soviet economy soon forced domestic priorities to 
supersede Cuba’s subsidy. Cuba saw the last year of full Soviet 
economic support in 1989. 
On December 31, 1990, the Soviets began to cut their aid 
programs and negotiated a new bilateral economic framework, whose 
terms formally ended the Soviet subsidy of the Cuban economy. The 
agreement stipulated the following: 
1. a sharp cut in the Soviet annual deliveries of petroleum and 
petroleum products to Cuba 
2. clearing commodity exchanges at world market prices 
3. reduction of the timespan governing the economic agreement 
from five years to one year, mainly due to the uncertain 
economic situation of the Soviet Union, and 
4. sharp reductions in military aid, including the withdrawal of 
technicians and advisors.3 
Since 1991, most of Cuba’s trade relations are governed by current 
world prices and hard currency transactions. Through December 
1991, imports from the Soviet Union amounted to 1,673 million 
pesos, 70 percent lower than imports received in 1989. The future 
configuration of economic relations with the former Soviet republics 
(particularly Russia) will be determined by the extent to which their 
respective economies have recovered or transitioned, and the world 
market price for oil versus Cuban sugar and nickel [Ref. 10: p. 991, 
[Ref. 11: p. 1251. 
President Mikhail Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba on September 12, 
1991, and by June 1993 the last contingent of Russian troops, numbering 300 men, had left Cuba. 
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The Cuban economy, formally dependent on the Soviet Bloc for 
85 per cent of its trade and investment, has shrunk by an estimated 
50 per cent since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Real 
GDP growth rate has declined steadily from 0.1 percent in 1989 to 
-25.0 percent in 1991.4 Cuba's imports from the former Soviet Union 
fell 70 percent, from $5.522 billion in 19895 to $1.673 billion in 
1991.6 Despite the end of the Cuban-Soviet economic relationship, 
markets still exist in both countries for exports by the other. Soviet- 
manufactured machinery in Cuba remains in desperate need of spare 
parts and there remains within the CIS a market for sugar estimated 
at 2 million metric tons.' TWO large voids resulted from the end of 
preferential Cuban-Soviet economic relations, implicit subsidization 
and badly needed imports. 
2. Past Economic Reform Measures: 1975-1990 
In 1975, the Cuban government began to increase their efforts 
to institutionalize both central planning and popular participation 
under the System of Management and Planning of the Economy 
[Sistema de Direction y Plantificacion de la Economia] (SDPE). The  
system included limited administrative autonomy for state farms, as 
well as broad structures for material incentives and popular 
participation. The institutionalization of planning and participation 
4 Em wo rld Outloo k 1994 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994), 194. 
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism in the USSR and 
Eastern Europe," chap. in CUBA After the Cold Wac (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1993), 171. 
(Santa Monica: RAND, Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, Cuba Adnft in a Postcommunist Wfdd . .  
1992) ,4 .  
bid, 32. 
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was expected to strengthen the planners’ ability to direct resource 
flows to support political priorities. I t  was expected to promote 
economic efficiency and permit more local input into economic 
decisions. [Ref. 12: p. 2321 The SDPE characterizes Cuba’s first 
attempt to implement central planning with stable institutions and 
defined functions [Ref. 13: p. 1261. 
The SDPE failed to cause significant decentralization, and 
prompted the Cuban government to introduce two subsequent reforms 
aimed to improve upon its functioning: the free farmers’ markets of 
the early 1980s, and the rectification process initiated in 1986. The  
collapse of trade relations between Cubaand the Soviet Bloc spawned 
another major economic reform: the special period in peacetime, 
announced in 1990. The current economic crisis in Cuba embodies 
the relative success and failure of these reforms, which represent both 
problem and solution. 
u. The Free Farmers’ Market 
The free farmers’ market, initiated in 1980, was intended 
to correct technical problems of the SDPE, such as poorly defined 
material incentives, irrational prices and insufficient enterprise 
autonomy [Ref. 12: p. 2381. The market allowed private fanners to  
domestically sell output produced above the state quota at free market 
prices. The free fanners’ market generated an increase in private 
sector output, but also produced side effects contrary to Cuba’s goals 
of socialist development [Ref. 14: p. 8311. Despite its success, the free 
farmers’ 
stopped 
market began to be severely curtailed by 1982 and was 
in 1986, even though it had succeeded in providing 
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consumers with an increased availability of foodstuffs [Ref. 15: p. 101. 
By restricting private trade, the government could better control what 
private farmers produced, and minimize the diversion of goods from 
the export to domestic market. The government also tried to take 
advantage of the closure by raising some parallel market retail prices. 
This strategy failed to generate the expected increased revenues, as in 
1988 parallel market sales rose by 13 million pesos, but total sales 
declined by 70 million pesos, as farmers lost their material incentive 
to maximize output. [Ref. 16: p. 781 
The introduction of the free farmers’ market soon became 
incongruous, creating high-income earning possibilities for individual 
farmers, and reducing the incentives for collectivization . The inability 
of the cooperatives to compete with individual farmers in terms of 
potential income levels was linked to their inability to sell in the 
lucrative private market.* Cooperatives were also under pressure to 
produce certain products which were socially desired, but unprofitable 
at state prices. [Ref. 14: pp. 834, 8361 
The Cuban experiment with free market mechanisms 
increased income inequality, stimulated the emergence of speculators, 
and diverted resources, including those intended for sugar cane, to 
the more profitable free markets. For Cuba, the free farmers’ market 
logically represents an essential part of any program striving to attain 
food self-sufficiency. Alonso points out that given the price incentives 
of afree market, production could respond in ashort period of time, 
At the height of their participation in the free farmers’ market, the cooperatives accounted for less than 10 
percent of the volume of sales. Carmen h e r e  and Mieke Mews, “Markets, Markets Everywhere? 
Understanding the Cuban Anomaly,” World Develonment 20, no. 6 (1992): 833. 
13 
usually a crop cycle.9 Contrary to this Fidel Castro has expressed his 
aversion to private farms, stating, "Group private property is not and 
will never be socialism. It  will simply be group capitalism." [Ref. 17: 
p. 941 Castro remains keenly aware that extending popular 
participation implies greatly reducing the power of party officials over 
the establishment of social priorities [Ref. 12: p. 238). 
b. The Rectification procesS 
The free farmers' markets of the 1980s were believed to 
have been a mistake in that they generated inequalities. In April 
1986, Fidel Castro called for the "rectification of errors and negative 
tendencies," a decision to place more emphasis on political 
consciousness and moral incentives. The major elements of the 
rectification process include: 
1. reversal of economic decentralization measures and 
recentralization of major decisions, 
2. the abolition of the free farmers' market, 
3. elimination or restriction of private manufacturing, service, and 
housing construction activities, 
4. reintroduction of construction "minibrigades" and the creation 
of construction contingents (production units assigned to an 
area), 
5. reduction of redundant workers, tightening of labor norms and 
wages, and emphasis on moral incentives, 
Jod F. Alonso, "The Free Farmers Market: A Rejected Approach But A Possible Solution," in 
for the Study of the Cuban Economy (Latin American and Caribbean Center: Florida International 
University, 1993), 179.- 
Volume 2 Second Annual Meeting in Miami. Flo rida. w t  1'3-15.1992 ,by The Association 
14 
-. ..... . 
6. attempts at macroeconomic stabilization, particularly the trade 
and budget deficit, and 
7.vigorous efforts to root out economic crime and corruption. 10 
According to Eckstein, the policies associated with the 
rectification campaign reveal a state attempting to address its fiscal 
needs, even at the expense of the class in whose interests it claims to 
rule. The rectification process suggested a renewed commitment by 
the Castro regime to socialist values and socialist organizing principles 
[Ref. 16: p. 831. In 1990 Mesa-Lago provided a statistical summary of 
the rectification process: 
. 
... in three or four years of the Rectification there has been: 
a 3.2% decline in per capita economic growth, a 7.4% 
decline in labor productivity, a 78% increase in the hard 
currency debt, a79% jump in the trade deficit with the 
USSR, no significant improvement in the hard currency 
trade balance and a 682% increase in the budget deficit 
[Ref. 17: p. 1031. 
The rectification process reversed the expansion of the 
private sector through the elimination of incipient market 
mechanisms. It also served to restore power to Castro and his 
paternalistic economic policies, causing further deterioration of the 
Cuban economy. 
c. The Special Period in Peacetime 
In August 1990, Fidel Castro announced the beginning of a 
”special period in the time of peace” acknowledging the erosion of 
Cuba’s international economic environment. Castro spoke of Cuba 
lo Jorge F. Perez-L6pez, “The Cuban Economy: rectification in a changing world,” (lamb rid ge Jou md of 
Economics 16 (March 1992): 115. 
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facing the "zero option" caused by a "double embargo": the dearth of 
Soviet Bloc imports and the unyielding U.S. trade policy. The austerity 
program is a combination of limited economic reform and drastic 
subsistence policy, the main objectives of the special period are to: 
1. reduce the consumption of oil and consumer goods through 
universal rationing, 
2. increase the production of staple foods through the colonization 
of new land and shifting surplus labor to the countryside, 
3. pursue foreign investment through joint ventures and 
production sharing arrangements, which promote hard currency 
earnings, and 
4. facilitate the reinsertion into the world markets by undertaking 
management and selective structural reforms. 1 1  
In summary, what had begun in 1975 as a campaign to  
institutionalize central planning and popular participation evolved into 
a desperate struggle for economic survival. The special period is 
characterized by scarcity and sacrifice, and represents Castro's 
indefinite strategy for dealing with the current crisis. I t  also has 
perpetuated black market activity and may result in increased civil 
opposition. Ultimately, what these past reform measures serve to 
reflect are latitude and ideological rigidity of the policies acceptable to  
Fidel Castro, and the balance struck between economic recovery 
(survival) and socialist preservation. 
l 1  Andrew Zimbalist, "Teetering on the Brink Cuba's Current Economic and Political Crisis," Journal of 
Latin h e  rican Stud i@ 24 (May 1992): 41 1. 
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. . . . 
R THE NATURE OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 
In the post-1990 period the Cuban economy is described by 
Gonzalez as a bifurcation, where socialism governs the internal 
economy and sugar sector while a new external sector is being created 
on the basis of joint enterprises with foreign investors in petroleum, 
tourism, biotechnology and other selected areas [Ref. 15: p. vi]. The 
nature of the economy, however, remains trade dependent, 
monocultural and subject to external shocks due to its unbalanced 
production matrix [Ref. 18: p. 171. The Cuban budget draws upon 
revenues which originate from three sources: the state sector, the 
non-state sector (the private sector plus cooperatives) and the 
population at large. In FY 1990 the state sector contributed 97.8 
percent of state budget revenues, the non-state sector, 0.6 percent 
and the population, 1.6 percent. [Ref. 19: p. 261. 
The Cuban economy is moving away from a centrally planned 
economy to establish the conditions for promoting efficient 
production and increasing hard currency earnings. The possible 
scenarios which may govern this transition include: 
1. Castro could remain in power implementing his present 
policies (even at the expense of increased repression), 
2. Castro could alter his economic course in a more liberal 
direction to defuse escalating discontent (shifting to a Chinese- 
type model), 
3. an overthrow of Castro by pragmatic elements in the Cuban 
government could retain a socialist orientation but incorporate 
market mechanisms, or 
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4. most unlikely, an invading force could overthrow Castro. 12 
A process of transition is a process of managing uncertainty and, in the 
case of Cuba, the last few years have been a period of increasing 
uncertainty [Ref. 20: p. 61. The future direction of the Cuban economy 
is dependent upon the extent to which socialism and the mechanisms 
of a centrally planned economy are suitable to meeting the economic 
challenges ahead. 
1. Socialism and Centrally Planned Economies 
The two traditional strengths of a centrally planned economy 
(CPE) are its ability to distribute scarce resources equitably and to 
mobilize resources in support of priority projects. The former has 
prevented mass unemployment and generalized malnutrition in Cuba. 
the latter has enabled Cuba to develop sources for earning hard 
currency. Together they form the backbone of the Castro regime’s 
strategy to cope with its economic crisis. [Ref. 21: p. 41 1 J 
The state sector within Cuba is by far the largest contributor to 
state revenues. Consequently, the economic returns of state endeavors 
and state-owned enterprises are vital elements within any CPE 
implementing a plan for growth or recovery. The dependence is 
described by Oleinik: 
To be able to perform its economic functions successfully, 
in accordance with national economic plans, the State 
must have at its disposal sufficient monetary resources and 
concentrate in its hands a considerable share of national 
income. [Ref. 19: p. 21 
12 Gillian Gunn, “Will Castro Fall?,” Foreip Policy 79 (Summer .1990):144. 
1 8  
State-owned enterprises have to contend with multiple objectives that 
often conflict with profit maximization, and may require explicit 
government subsidies or implicit subsidies such as guaranteed sales to 
the government at fured prices [Ref. 22: p. 141. Higher prices would 
eliminate the need for state subsidies to producers, and would allow a 
cut in the state budget. Cognizant of such distortions, a session of the 
Cuban National Assembly held during early-May 1994, reported that 
only 31 percent of the state companies are profitable and that 
subsidies to loss-making state enterprises would be cut [Ref. 23: 
pp. 4-51. 
Within CPEs, prices--including the exchange rate--are set 
administratively and do not reflect relative scarcities or the costs of 
producing goods and services. Fixed wholesale prices facilitate plan 
construction and monitoring of plan implementation, while fixed 
consumer prices avoid open inflation. Centrally determined prices 
reflect planners' preferences rather than those of consumers, and do 
not provide incentives for f m s  to produce goods other than those 
required by the state. [Ref. 7: pp. 20-211 
The institutional framework of CPEs may also negatively affect 
foreign trade. State monopoly of foreign trade insulates domestic 
producers and consumers from foreign markets. Insulation from 
competitive forces in the world market means that domestic 
producers need only meet low domestic standards for quality, 
reliability, and innovation. This insulation is partly responsible for the 
difficulties faced by CPEs in selling manufactured products in the 
world market. The emphasis on quantity targets, and on managerial 
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rewards based on fulfillment of quantitative targets, leads to a lack of 
attention to quality and limits the ability of CPEs to compete in those 
markets where quality is an important factor. [Ref. 8: pp. 84-85] 
a. Cuba Compared to the China Experience 
Fidel Castro recently responded, *It is an experiment that 
must be studied,” when asked if China was an example to follow.13 
One distinctive feature of the Chinese economic transition which 
distinguishes it from Cuba is that China started from a more balanced 
macroeconomic position, applied generally conservative 
macroeconomic policies, and was not subject to large external shocks 
during reform [Ref. 24: p. 1271. A large country that was not 
dependent on the Soviet Union, China was not affected to a great 
extent by the political transition that took place. The costs of 
remaining in power of its ruling group were not sharply increased, and 
it could continue to move toward a market economy without greater 
fear of losing political control than before the Soviet collapse. [Ref. 25: 
p. 2461 A gradual transition strategy requires effective state 
management; how to frame this role constructively becomes 
increasingly more difficult when the state loses the capacity to enforce 
it policies.14 The political stability maintained in China has been an 
important factor encouraging the investment and growth needed to 
effect monumental changes smoothly. [Ref. 24: p. 1281 
l3  “Exclusive” interview with Fidel Castro by La Sfampa reporter Jas Gawronski; place and date not given, 
FBIS-LAT-94-OO3-A, 5 January 1994. 
l4  Eastern Europe and Russia ,with some exceptions, have completely new political systems with little 
capacity to implement government economic functions, including such basic functions as the ability to 
collect taxes. Dwight H. Perkins, “Comment” on the work of Alan Gelb, Gary Jefferson, and Inderjit 
Singh, “Can Communist Economies Transform Incrementally? The Experience of China,” 
Jvfacroeconomic Annual 1993, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 133. 
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Some of the lessons learned from China are contradictory 
to Cuban economic reforms initiated since the early 1980s; such as 
those that advocate the fundamental creation of private agriculture and 
economic incentives designed to tempt large numbers of people into 
becoming entrepreneurs [Ref. 26: p. 3241. The most significant 
conclusion that Castro may have derived from the Chinese experience 
is that political economy, rather than simply economic theories, lies at 
the heart of the process of socialist transition. According to Gelb, 
Jefferson and Singh, it is most unlikely that China-style reform would 
be acceptable or successful with a sharp transition away from 
communist government. The basic outline of economic reform in 
China seems to be irreversible, but there is still a possibility that a 
chaotic political transition could damage macroeconomic stability and 
stall reform movement [Ref. 24: pp. 127-293. 
Fidel Castro also became a quick study of the attempted 
reforms that eventually undermined other communist regimes, and 
adheres to the following: 
1. undertake as few political reforms as possible, 
2. get rid of deadwood in the party early on, 
3. deal harshly with potential or evident disloyalty, and 
4. do not allow formal opposition to organize. 15 
The Castro regime has thus far  considered these tenets an integral 
part of any strategy effecting economic recovery or transition. 
Two additional lessons of the China experience are given 
by Sachs,16 both of which Cuba has recently experienced first-hand. 
l5 Jorge I. Dominguez, “The Secrets of Castro’s Staying Power,” Affairs (Spring 1993), 99. 
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First: “Small business development can proceed rapidly, even in a 
poor country and after decades of repression.” The September 1993 
decree legalizing 1 17 enterprises for self employment soon resulted 
in uncontrollable chaos and was subsequently amended in early March  
1994. Government officials were concerned that many 
“entrepreneurs” were not paying taxes; stealing their merchandise 
from the state; or charging steep dollar prices. Second: 
“Macroeconomic destabilization can provoke social unrest with harsh 
consequences, as occurred in China in 1989.” On August 5, 1994, a 
riot involving approximately 20,000 people erupted in Havana. The 
melee, spurred by a rumor of a ferry bound for Florida and dire 
economic conditions, left two police officers killed and thirty-five 
people injured. 
b. M a r k e t  Socialism and Mixed Economies 
In a broad sense, a socialist market economy is one in 
which there is decentralized decision-making and socialized 
ownership. Despite its collectivization efforts and long-standing 
resistance to the use of markets, since the 1970s the Cuban 
government has increasingly recognized the limitations of central 
planning as a means of producing and distributing all but the most 
essential consumer goods [Ref. 14: p. 8261. A social market would 
permit the continuation of social achievements and would also 
stimulate the efficiency advantages made possible by the orchestration 
of economic activity by the market mechanism [Ref. 27: p. 291. Market 
l6 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Comment” on the work of Alan Gelb, Gary Jefferson, and Inderjit Singh, “Can 
Communist Economies Transform Incrementally? The Experience of China,” W E R  Macroeco nomic 
Annual 1993, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 143. 
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socialism represents an alternative to the Castro regime, which over 
the long term wants to ensure that the establishment of market 
mechanisms do not undermine the society's socialist ethos or threaten 
existing authority [Ref. 28: p. 621. 
There are potential difficulties in utilizing market 
mechanisms to perfect central planning. First, the benefits of 
resource allocation within markets are highly dependent on markets 
taking a specific form. Markets must function as an interrelated, 
competitive systems in which prices of inputs and outputs are 
mutually responsive, and can successfully transfer information 
conveying both scarcity and consumer demand in related markets. 
Secondly, market mechanisms consistently generate tensions within 
the institutional architecture of a central plan, as entrepreneurs 
compete with the state for valuable resources. [Ref. 14: p. 8271 In 
addition, entrepreneurial opportunities may cause excessive migration 
or absenteeism of the work force, adversely affecting state production. 
The sustainability of a market socialist economy is assessed by Antonio 
as, "neither structurally nor functionally operable. I t  would be a living 
contradiction in continual conflict with itself." [Ref. 29: p. 71 
Baloyra contends that current Cuban policy calls for a 
mixed economy, combining foreign capitalist enclaves, primarily in 
the export and tourism sector, with socialist production and 
distribution predominantly in the domestic sector [Ref. 20: p. 141. 
This model blends the free market with a planned economy, mixes 
private and public ownership, and balances a concern for efficiency 
against equity. However, it places less emphasis on the market, 
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private-sector ownership, and efficiency in favor of distributional 
equity and public-sector involvement in the economy. [Ref. 27: p. 251 
A mixed economy may result in a dichotomy as glaring 
inequities are excused as necessary incentives to attract elusive 
foreign capital. Cuba's attempt to create enclaves of foreign investors 
sends profits abroad while it imposes upon workers the high cost of 
state production for the domestic market. Prices are used to 
redistribute income rather than allocate resources, creating 
bottlenecks in the supply of many goods. Firms with export potential 
are likely to be pressured to buy inputs from inefficient state-owned 
monopolistic suppliers when cheaper inputs are available from abroad. 
Cardoso and Helwege warn that Castro's joint ventures in tourism and 
exports do not ensure efficiency and competitiveness. As the 
principal investor in these joint ventures, the Cuban government may 
end up  absorbing heavy losses. [Ref. 30: pp. 55-57] 
2. Present Concerns 
Ritter argues that the root cause of Cuba's economic contraction 
from 1986 to 1990 was ultimately the decline in the real value of the 
implicit subsidization from the USSR and the convertible-currency 
debt crisis, which stifled imported industrial inputs and retarded 
growth [Ref. 31: p. 1181. The cessation of Cuban-Soviet trade relations 
has since led to major declines in the availability of foreign exchange, 
in the capacity to import, in levels of economic activity and 
investment, and in real living standards [Ref. 27: p. 41. The 
accelerated structural deterioration of the Cuban economy is of major 
concern; it forms the basis of increased frustration and growing 
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popular discontent. Currently, the majority of Cuban trade is 
restricted to hard currency transactions and thereby obligates Cuba to 
reduce its external dependence, and develop a virtually self-financed 
growth strategy [Ref. 31: p. 1191. 
The two factors that determine the outcome of reforms, 
according to Cardoso and Helwege, are the political legitimacy of the 
transition, and economic policies [Ref. 30: p. 821. Cuban economist 
Tejada concedes that economic reforms conducive to a mixed socialist 
economy are inevitable, but warns they will invariably introduce 
market forces that could result in major deformations spoiling the 
very transformation achieved by the revolution. He specifies that 
private enterprise would alleviate some of the burden of the State to 
subsidize unemployment but it also produces an income differential. 
[Ref. 32: pp. 87, 841 Monreal and Rua del Llano, of the Center of 
American Studies in Cuba, claim that the opening of the Cuban 
economy has demonstrated, if only partially, that the transition from 
one economic structure to another is possible while preserving the 
social bases of political power [Ref. 33: p. 501. The present concerns 
of the Castro regime are to meet urgent economic challenges with 
viable reforms that produce tangible results, despite their being taxed 
by limiting factors. 
a. Cuba's Economic Challenges 
The challenge for Cuba in the immediate term is to 
achieve economic reorientation while maintaining the basic equity of 
income distribution and its success in fulfilling basic human needs 
[Ref. 31: p. 1441. The inability of the Cuban government to guarantee a 
- -  
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respectable level of popular consumption and maintain basic nutrition 
could become a flash point €or political upheaval against the Castro 
regime. Alonso and Rathbone see Cuba's survival dilemma resulting 
from the fact that: 
Economic returns.. .are not re-invested to create 
tomorrow's opportunities for Cubans; they are used to fund 
today's survival. ..success (of Castro's reforms) merely 
means that the strategy continues [Ref. 34: pp. 123, 1251. 
The low level of domestic consumption is probably manageable 
as long as the political cohesion of the government and the security 
forces prevails. Up to now popular discontent has been diffused by an 
unopposed mass exodus of Cubans from the island. Through 
September 1, 1994, 22,484 Cuban boatpeople were rescued by the 
U.S. Coast Guard and Navy, the largest one-year exodus since the 
Marie1 boatlift of 1980. On September 9, 1994, after eight days of 
negotiation, the Castro regime pledged to stop its citizens from fleeing 
Cuba for Florida aboard makeshift rafts and small boats. In return, 
Washington promised to accept at least 20,000 new Cuban immigrants 
each year. 
Cuban economists agree that there exists the need for 
changes and readjustments that serve to preserve the historic 
objectives of the Revolution: national independence, social equality, 
popular democracy and economic development. As such, they see two 
fundamental objectives to any current economic strategy: to maintain 
_.  the benefits guaranteed by the Revolution and to reinsert Cuba into the 
world economy. [Ref. 35: p. 11 The economic challenges confronting 
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Cuba, although simply stated, involve complex interrelations between 
the internal and external sectors of the economy. 
Current challenges to the internal sector of the Cuban 
economy include: 
1. promoting productive employment to reduce low economic 
efficiency ; 
2. expanding agricultural output to achieve food sufficiency; 
3. maintaining the quality of social services degraded by resource 
limitations imposed by the special period; 
4. pursuing alternative sources of energy; 
5. controling financial imbalances and inflationary pressures; and 
6.  minimizing the impact of infrastructure deterioration. 
According to Cuban economist, Carranza Valdez, a 
fundamental principle of the economic system should be a strong 
relation between a worker’s wages and their output thereby linking 
individual and national entrepreneurial interests. However, this is to 
occur during a difficult time, when there are contradictory movements 
between the necessary centralization of scarce resource management 
caused by the crisis and the decentralization necessary to change the 
existing system. [Ref. 36: p. 301 
The interdependence between the internal and external 
sectors, regarding their role in meeting these economic challenges, is 
summarized by Cuban economist Luis Rodriguez, as: 
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... the ability to address domestic problems is predicated on 
solving the very difficult current international situation. In 
fact, it is evident that the resource limitations imposed by 
the Special Period cannot be eased and the external 
financial balance and economic efficiency will not improve 
in any meaningful way unless foreign trade and financing 
flows improve. [Ref. 37: p. 391 
Current challenges to the external sector of the Cuban economy 
include : 
1. overcoming the effects of changes in economic relations with 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: 
2. increasing foreign exchange earnings through the diversification 
of exports; 
3. integrating into global markets; and 
4. attracting foreign investment. 
Carranza Valdez explains that through the expansion of 
non-traditional exports and import substitution Cuba can reduce 
external dependence through internal integration that essentially 
includes foodstuff self-sufficiency. Non-traditional exports must 
increase so that Cuba can continue to import despite the absence of 
international credit. For the next few years the Cuban economy will be 
forced to function at an import level below its needs. [Ref. 36: pp. 15, 
211 Antonio adds that the transforming effort must focus on those 
conglomerates or blocks of economic sectors, which because of their 
importance in the nation's economy and their systemic relations with 
other sectors and activities, promise to contribute the most toward 
growth and recovery [Ref. 29: p. 271. 
The reintegration of Cubainto the capitalist global market 
may also take place through trade-partner diversification which 
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requires a search for new exports and other sources of revenue and 
foreign capital. The principal obstacle to Cuban trade has been the 
lack of sellable exports and the excessive concentration on sugar 
exports, now aggravated by the disappearance of socialist trade 
partners and subsidies. [Ref. 38: p. 2081 Foreign exchange earnings 
for 1995 are estimated to be between $2.3-$2.9 billion, compared to 
$5.8 billion in 1989, and represent no significant change from 1992 
[Ref. 39: p. xiv]. 
b. Limiting Factors 
The Cuban economic structure was not designed to 
compete in the world market but to operate within another 
institutional framework: that of the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CEMA). CEMA was an international governmental 
organization incorporating many countries from the former Soviet Bloc 
whose airn was to promote the “socialist economic integration” of its 
members. Cuba joined CEMA in 1972, which was originally set up  at a 
conference in Moscow in early J a n u q  1949 and formally dissolved 
June  28, 1991. [Ref. 40: pp. xi, rocxi] Until the 199Os, 80 percent of 
Cuban export sales were guaranteed by CEMA so there was no 
incentive to diversify and improve quality [Ref. 38: p. 2121. Can-anza 
Valdez claims the loss resulting from the break in relations between 
Cuba and the socialist camp was not only favorable commercial ties but 
a strong economic integration [Ref. 36: p. 61. The disappearance of 
Cuba’s traditional trade partners has left the Cuban economy isolated 
and in possession of a dysfunctional institutional structure. These 
conditions are exacerbated by current account and trade deficits, and 
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the inability to service its foreign debt; all which severely limit Cuba’s 
access to capital investments, advanced technology and international 
markets. 
The political rigidity and lack of experience with market 
mechanisms of the Castro regime have impaired its ability to fulfill 
what Aguila calls, “its responsibilities as the guardian of revolutionary 
morality” [Ref. 41: p. 731. Rtter asserts that over time, the current 
system (centrally planned and demarketized) has blocked the 
economic improvement and diversification necessary to maintain and 
enhance social welfare gains [Ref. 27: p. 161. Within a centrally 
planned economy, corruption and persistent shortages are likely to 
proliferate without a flexible supply of inputs [Ref. 14: p. 8371. Such 
economic inefficiency promotes civil opposition and unrest, increasing 
political risk that may dissuade potential investors; it also prevents the 
internal economy from benefiting from such things as foreign 
investment [Ref. 36: p. 271. 
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III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FORECAST SPECIFICATIONS 
! Presented in this chapter are the political environment within 
which Cuba’s economic decisions are most likely to be influenced, and 
the areas of the Cuban economy upon which those decisions will most 
likely be focused. The purpose of such dissection is to define the 
framework used to develop the forecast scenarios presented in 
Chapter 4. Examined here are the dominant political and economic 
sectors that affect Cuba’s attempt at achieving the terminal state 
desired by Fidel Castro. 
A THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Cuba is faced with unfavorable external conditions not of its own 
making. It also confronts detrimental internal conditions that are of 
its own making. This combination is likely to produce an untenable 
situation with potential for turmoil and probable change [Ref. 42: p. 
211. The political environment under which such turmoil and change 
exists in Cuba is defined by Fidel Castro’s commitment to Cuban 
socialism despite civil discontent over decreasing levels of domestic 
consumption and social benefits. Influential to the short-term 
economic decisions undertaken by the Castro regime will be the 
perceived intensity, extent and duration of popular opposition, and the 
~- regime’s ability to suppress or appease. For the purpose of this study 
the political longevity of Fidel Castro and his policies are assumed to 
prevail into the near term. In addition, estimates concerning 
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dollarization of the Cuban economy and inflation on the black market 
will serve as a crude barometer of civil discontent. 
1. The Leadership of Fidel Castro 
The Cuban context within which decisions are made to deal with 
the economic crisis will first and foremost succumb to the 
paternalistic rule of Fidel Castro and his dominance not only within 
the political strata but his stature as an icon of Cuban nationalism. 
Castro equated his version of socialism with Cuban nationalism in a 
December 1989 speech: 
In Cuba, revolution, socialism, and national independence 
are insolubly linked. ... If capitalism returned someday to 
Cuba, our independence and sovereignty would disappear 
forever. We would be an extension of Miami. [Ref. 43: p. 
1401 
The current economic policies of Fidel Castro demonstrate a 
reluctance to stray from centralization and his intentions of cautiously 
guarding political control. According to Jaime Suchlicki, Director of 
the North-South Center at the University of Miami, "economic 
considerations have never dominated Castro's policies" [Ref. 44: p. 
1051. Similarly, Baloyra describes Cuba's "re-equilibration as an 
attempt by the historic leaders to subordinate the scope and nature of 
change to their own political suMval" [Ref. 20: p. 91. 
Castro's most recent reforms have been aimed at increasing 
foreign exchange in the hands of the government, rather than 
privatizing enterprises and freeing prices [Ref. 45: p. 321. Fidel Castro 
and his economic vision for transition have so far been derived from 
his proclamation that, "We must base ourselves on our experience, our 
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own ideas, our own interpretations of Marxism-Leninism." and is 
prophetically reflected in the comments made by Lenin in 1921: 
We should not give in to romantic socialism ... that feels an 
unconscionable disdain for commerce. All economic forms . 
are admissible during transition.. . [and] necessary.. .to 
reactivate the economy ... forms of commerce that are used 
in the capitalist countries ... can foster an improvement of 
commercial activity under socialism once they are drained 
of their capitalist content. [Ref. 46: pp. 119, 1071 
The probability of Cuban policy makers committing serious errors is 
high since macroeconomic policy expertise or experience within Cuba 
is extremely limited. Consequently, a misguided policy could have 
disastrous results that would be difficult to remedy or reverse in the 
short or medium term. Humberto Leon of the Cuban Information 
Service at the North-South Center, University of Miami, characterizes 
Fidel Castro as not willing to accept nor understand that the economy 
will not recover unless the domestic population is allowed to 
participate via market reforms which in turn will generate growth 
[Ref. 471. Leon summarizes the critical centrality of Fidel Castro by 
The power of Fidel Castro is based on the control that 
Fidel Castro has over the problem and the dependence of 
the problem on Fidel Castro. [El poder de Fidel Castro 
esta basado en el control que tiene Fidel Castro sobre el 
problema y la dependencia que tiene el problema de Fidel 
Castro.] 
Joseph Stiglitz asserts that transforming to a market economy 
does not entail a withering away of the state but instead a redefinition 
l7 Humberto Leon, personal interview by author, 24 June 1994, Miami, The North-South Center, 
University of Miami. 
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of its role [Ref. 48: p. 41. Considering the case of Cuba, this-sentiment 
is echoed by Jose Alonso, T h e  Cuban government should be a partner, 
a regulator and facilitator, beyond that it fails." [Ref. 491 In summary, 
if the Castro regime is to remain in control, it must find ways to re- ~ 
legitimize itself through economic recovery and political revitalization 
[Ref. 50: p. 71. 
2. Civil and Military Opposition 
Dominguez observes that opposition to the Castro regime is 
weakened disproportionately by economic duress, as most Cubans 
invest virtually all their energies simply to survive. Any opposition 
remains hampered by a lack of leadership and organization to 
capitalize on current social and economic hardships [Ref. 1: p. 1061. 
Only three organizations have sufficient institutional strength to pose 
serious challenges to the Cuban leadership: a) the Communist P a r t y  of 
Cuba (PCC), b) the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and c) the 
Interior Ministry (MININT); all of which remain steadfastly loyal to or  
inherently controlled by Fidel Castro. So far  opposition in Cuba has 
not been able to (or chosen not to) establish and consolidate itself at 
either aleadership level, political or military, or within the ranks of 
the masses [Ref. 20: p. 131. Local protests, most often manifested by 
acts of vandalism or petty theft, are directed against economic 
shortages and presently do not seriously challenge the political system 
[Ref. 45: p. 311. This may soon change as consumer goods become 
more scarce and passive civil disobedience escalates to active civil 
unrest; forcing the Castro regime to consider economic concessions it 
previously deemed destabilizing. 
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a. CivilDiscontent 
Communist rhetoric, according to Aguila, is rapidly losing 
its motivational power, and can no longer convince the masses that 
reliance on ideological convictions will guarantee their subsistence . 
[Ref. 51: p. 981. Fidel Castro having witnessed the demise of President 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the irreversible consequences of perestrioka 
and glasnost within the Soviet Union, has since deferred to his natural 
instincts to contain, channel and control any discontent [Ref. 52: p. 
1451. Many of Castro's most outspoken critics, such as Catholic 
bishops and human rights activists, have been publicly admonished or  
jailed. Baloyra explains the current delineation of domestic priorities: 
"people are just too preoccupied and busy with subsistence to engage 
in... spontaneous combustion ..." [Ref. 20: p. 211. 
The passivity of Cuban civil society may be partly due to the 
absence of any perceived alternative to Castro [Ref. 53: p. 291. Falcoff 
argues that, as long as the crucial second tier of civil and military 
officials sees its very survival as being associated with that of the Castro 
regime, it is not likely to rush into precipitous action. There is also a 
genuine fear of a presumptively revanchist Cuban exile community, 
which would lay claim to the island and indiscriminately purge those 
who have collaborated with the regime, even those in fairly minor 
positions. I t  is also true that those Cubans who have remained home 
and paid the price for the Castro regime for nearly two generations 
will naturally feel that the future is theirs to determine, not those who 
have spent that period in (what to them will seem) more comfortable 
circumstances. [Ref. 54: p. 7, 101 The Cuban elite under present 
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conditions also have no collective interest in Castro's eviction. In fact, 
the continuation of the existing system is their sole guarantee of 
survival. [Ref. 55: p. 1051 
b. The Revolutionary Armed Forces FAR)'8 
In 1989, the FAR assumed complete control of the entire 
security apparatus in Cuba, a move that has enhanced the FAR'S stature 
in the government and facilitates government control of the society 
during the economic crisis. Overall the military seems to be operating 
on the premise that the government is dealing with the crisis and has 
an economic plan for recovery that will prevent the breakdown of 
internal order. The military high command likely believes that the 
population needs only a little more food and electricity to  dispel much 
of its frustration and anger. The FAR assesses the present crisis as 
survivable, the economic recovery to be prolonged and arduous, and 
Castroas the best person to guide the country through the transition. 
[Ref. 45: pp. 16, 30-331 
The FAR does not appear to be experiencing a breakdown 
of institutional cohesion or a significant erosion of support for Fidel 
Castro or the Communist Party, and consequently serves to sustain the 
regime. The military has been fully in step with the civilian response 
to what is considered a national emergency. It  has thus far supported 
the government's repressive measures designed to force the 
population to accept Castro's economic and political reforms. The 
FAR is unlikely to promote radical changes in the government because 
l8 This sub-section relies heavily upon A. B. Montes, _The Military Response W u b a  's Economic 
W, Defense Intelligence Agency, August 1993. 
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the FAR itself is an integral part of the government.*g The military 
budget, estimated to be 11 percent of the national income in 1990, 
has probably been reduced by almost half in absolute terms. I t  remains 
unclear, however, whether that proportion of the national income has 
also declined. At present the FAR does not consider itself separate 
from the political process or the final arbiter of political legitimacy in 
Cuba. [Ref. 45: pp. 5-6, 28-30] 
R THE ECONOMIC AREAS OF FOCUS 
The decisions made by the Castro regime in response to the 
current crisis have thus far focused on three economic areas: the 
major production sectors of the economy, foreign direct investment 
and the increasing significance of the black market. Key to any re- 
equilibration, or recovery strategies within the immediate term are 
the major sectors of the Cuban economy that are capable of earning 
hard currency or providing import substitutes. Similarly, the 
successful attraction of foreign direct investment could considerably 
factor into the output production matrix of the Cuban economy, 
particularly if it materializes as sorely needed capital. Additional 
problems and solutions stem from the coexistence of three distinct 
tiers within the Cuban economy. The first is the international semi- 
capitalist tier exclusively reserved for tourists: the second is the 
official socialist economy that currently fails to meet popular demands: 
and the third is the legal, semi-legal or illegal private market-oriented 
economy [Ref. 27: p. 151. The black market composes the largest 
l9 According to A.B. Montes of the Defense Intelligence Agency, those military pesonnel most disgusted 
with the situation appear more inclined to defect than protest openly or organize secret opposition. 
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subset that increasingly dominates within the third tier, yielding both 
aggravation and reprieve to economic planners. While the black 
market accelerates the dollarization of the Cuban economy and is 
contradictory to socialist political and economic aims, it also serves to 
alleviate some of the economic and social pressures placed upon the 
second tier and may concurrently quell, or nominally minimize, any 
widespread civil discontent or disobedience. 
A frank study published in Havana by the Center for American 
Studies estimates that the crippled Cuban economy cannot generate 
even 40 percent of the income needed to buy essential consumer 
goods abroad. Cuba’s total reserves in hard currency and precious 
metals fell over 88 percent, from $102 million in 1991 to $12 million 
in 1992. [Ref. 56: p. 481 Cuban officials have said that they believe that 
the economy can function on a minimum of U.S. $4 billion of exports 
per annum. Alonso and Rathbone estimated the 1992-93 export 
revenues to total between $2.10 and $2.65 billion. [Ref. 34: p. 1201 
These estimates seem to corroborate those made by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, which reported that hard currency exports were 
expected to fall from $2.2 billion in 1992 to $1.8 billion in 1993 [Ref. 
57: p. 1941. 
According to an internal report prepared for the Cuban Council 
of Ministers in November 1992: of the 415 basic products that 
guarantee Cuba’s production and are included in the macroeconomic 
basket, 266 could not be either imported or produced nationally. The 
availability of the remaining 189 fluctuated between 5 and 26 percent 
of historical inventories. The report comments that the scarcity of 
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parts, replacements, components and attachments limits production 
and transportation, and results in a high incidence of breakages in all 
types of equipment and minimal or nonexistent maintenance 
possibilities. [Ref. 58: p. 11 In mid-October 1990, the Ministry of Light 
Industry reported that 321 factories under its purview had adopted a 
shortened schedule (24 hours per week) because of shortages of 
imported raw materials and spare parts; 26 additional factories had 
been shut down altogether for the same reason [Ref. 11: p. 1221. By 
January 1993, roughly 75 percent of Cuban factories had simply 
stopped producing anything because of the lack of raw materials [Ref. 
20: p. 91. 
1. The Sugar Industry 
The sugar industry continues to be Cuba’s primary source of 
foreign exchange. All 156 sugar mills and all sugar refineries in Cuba 
belong to the Ministry of the Sugar Industry. Sugar marketing is also 
under state control with domestic rationed quotas distributed through 
the Ministry of Internal Trade, while CUBAZUCAR is the agency in 
charge of negotiating and marketing foreign sales [Ref. 59: p. 41. 
Agricultural enterprises, cooperatives, and lands of farmers dedicated 
to sugarcane production account for almost 1.9 million hectares or 46 
percent of the total cultivated area in the country, and represent 12 
percent of total civil employment. Sugar and its derivatives represent 
75 percent of Cuba’s total exports, and 18 percent of Cuba’s total 
capital investment and consume one-third of available energy. [Ref. 60: 
p. 931 
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Cuba's sugar milling complex is old; upwards of 90 percent of 
the factories were built before 1925. The most recent 6 mills were 
constructed as a result of CEMA commitments made during the period 
1981-1987. According to Alonso, the Cuban sugar industry has been 
subject to a process of decapitalization since 1989, and he estimates 
that 20 to 30 sugar mills did not grind in 1993. [Ref. 491 The majority 
of Cuban sugar is manufactured as raws to be further refined by 
importers. Cuba's capacity to make refined sugar is limited to less 
than 900.000 tons. [Ref. 61: p. 1271 Rivero observes three major 
problems facing the Cuban sugar industry: 
1. serious difficulties in production, 
2. loss of traditional preferential markets, and 
3. lack of capital for repairs and maintenance. 20 
Sugar markets abroad demand white sugar, but sugar, as a 
commodity, has perfect substitutes such as aspartame and high 
fructose corn syrup. The effects of those perfect substitutes have 
undermined the size of the market for sugar. In addition, sugar is 
vulnerable to price fluctuations and trade barriers [Ref. 9: p. 151. 
Cuban scholar Miguel Figueras warns that it is difficult to build a 
normal society in a country that depends almost exclusively on a 
product whose quantity and price are subject to great fluctuations. 
The solution to Cuba's problem is to reduce its dependence on sugar, 
not by means of producing less sugar but rather by developing new 
enterprises. [Ref. 60: p. 701 Perez-L6pez sees the Cuban export basket 
*O NicolAs Rivero, "Thoughts on the Cuban Sugar Industry," in Cuba in Trans ition Volume 2: Seco nd 
Economy (Miami: Florkki International University, 1993), 128. 
AmualMet  ine - in Miami. Florida. AUPU st 13-15. 1992. by the Association for the Study of the Cuban 
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toward sugar that a shift to commercial terms for its sugar trade will 
severely reduce Cuba's revenues [Ref. 1 1: p. 1231. 
a, Frduction Output and World Market Absorption 
Cuban-American economist Jose Alonso maintains that 
Cuba maintains a comparative advantage in sugar production as a result 
of considerable technical and agricultural expertise. The cost per ton 
per yield of sugar remains one of the lowest in the world, being most 
significant in the medium-size estates. Alonso views the major 
obstacles facing the Cuban sugar industry not as consequences of mill 
grinding capacity, but as resulting from a lack of supply inputs into the 
agricultural ("field") industry. Alonso finds gross inefficiency within 
the Cuban sugar industry as current production levels could be 
attained using one-third the mills (about 50) and one third the land, 
approximately 66,000 acres, if the industry were to be privatized. [Ref. 
491 Cuban sugar production is down 51 percent since 1989 with the 
most significant declines occurring in 1993 and 1994, a consequence 
of high winds, heavy rains, and severe shortages of supply inputs. 
The Cuban sugar production output, in metric tons, since 1989 is 
summarized below: 
1989a 8.10mt 
1990a 8.00 mt 
1991a 7.62mt 
1992a 7.03 mt 
1993b 4.28mt 
1994C 3.6-3.7 mt (estimate) 
a Source: The CRI3 Commoditv Yearbook 1994 
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b Source: EIU World Outlook 1994 
C As reported by Mimi Whitefield in, "Cuba sugar harvest is worst in 30 
years," The Miami Herald, 24 June 1994, 19(A) 
The sugar quota policies implemented by developed 
countries act as a double-edged sword against sugarcane producers: it 
offers sugar prices that are above the world market level, but it also 
restricts purchases to such an extent that the exporting countries are 
forced to dump large quantities of sugar on the free market, or find 
alternative, preferential trade agreements [Ref. 62: p. 1631. Nearly 75 
percent of the world's sugar production is for local consumption and 
sold by domestic producers at high subsidized price levels. 
Consequently, the so-called "world market" becomes a residual 
market, making up less than two percent of sugar sales at a price of 
8*-12* per pound, which according to Western experts, does not 
cover the average cost of production of any sugar exporting country 
[Ref. 15: p. 301. About 110 million tons of sugar are traded worldwide, 
of which only about 10-15 percent is traded at the world market price 
[Ref. 60: p. 1. The EIU reports that the world market price for sugar is 
projected to be 10@-11+ per pound [Ref. 57: p. 1961. In 1989, Cuban 
sugar exports to the world market totaled 1.65 million tons, and 
represented a 9.4 percent share of the world market (Ref. 58: p. 271. 
b. By-product Diuersi3cation 
World sugar demand is shifting from raws to refined, or  
whites, and Cuba must reactively adapt production to world market 
conditions if 
diversification 
it is to remain competitive. Under this reality, 
away from raw sugar and molasses into a higher value 
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added product is needed. Such products can be grouped into three 
categories: sugar, alcohol (such as ethanol for fuel use), and by- 
products. The sugar-ethanol issue as part of a national sugar strategy 
could be an attractive option for Cuba within an integrated industry 
strategy. [Ref. 61: pp. 128, 1301 . 
Cuba is the only producer country with an institution 
dedicated to the development of sugar derivatives. According to Cuban 
estimates, less than 15 percent of the potential for developing by- 
products has been attained. Most of the by-products are derived from 
bagasse, 51 percent and molasses, 24 percent. [Ref. 13: p. 1051 
Alonso and Lago contend that the sugar by-products industry could 
become a mainstay source of new employment and provide the basis 
for Cuba’s diversification away from sugar as a commodity [Ref. 9: p. 
211. Within the same context, Alonso believes Cuba need only produce 
4-5 million tons of sugar, 7 million tons maximum, to both meet its 
domestic requirement (700,000-900,000 tons) and optimize export 
earnings. [Ref. 491 
2. The Tourism Industry 
Cuban government officials project that tourism will be Cuba’s 
primary source of hard currency earnings by the end of this century. 
Regardless of the outcome, the significance of tourism as an export 
industry is sure to increase in the near term, considering the 
obstacles facing other Cuban export enterprises. The economic 
benefits of tourism result from an improved balance of payments, 
generation of government revenues, increased income and job 
creation, and the promotion of growth and development. Espino 
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provides a caveat however, that “The tourist sector’s ability to 
stimulate economic growth depends on its linkages to the rest of the 
economy.” Thus far, the tourism enclave model adopted by the Castro 
regime combined with the limitations of the Cuban economy have 
curtailed the establishment of such intra-industry linkages. [Ref. 63: 
pp. 57-65) A recent study by La Sociedad Economica, a London-based 
organization that monitors the cuban Economy, reported only 12.5 
percent of the total gross revenue generated by tourism was spent on 
local enterprises, and that the tourism sector accounted for only 1.6 
percent (62,000 people) of total employment [Ref. 64: p. 1331. 
In Cuba, tourism is creating social distortions, ”tourist 
apartheid,” and is the direct result of a two-currency economy, with 
dollars used by foreigners and pesos used by the vast majority of 
Cubans [Ref. 65: p. 8221. Tourism also creates ideological problems 
for the Castro government, which must justify the expenditure of 
limited foreign exchange on imported whiskey, and other amenities at 
a time when most Cubans receive paltry food rations [Ref. 66: p. 1291. 
Espino notes that Cuban concessions to foreign investors regarding 
guaranteed profit repatriation and waiver of import t&s may 
seriously reduce the potential benefits from international tourism. 
The economic contribution of tourism to national income and 
employment is still very small both in absolute terms and in relation to 
national levels. This, according to Espino, is due to two factors: 1) the 
low value of the tourism income mu1tiplier;zl and 2) constraints on the 
supply of inputs. [Ref. 63: pp. 62, 651 
~~ ~ 
21 The value of the estimated tourist multiplier for Cuba ranges from .74 to .84, which compares to .88 for 
Antigua and 1.58 for Jamaica. Maria Dolores Espino, “Tourism in Cuba: A Development Strategy for the 
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According to the statistics from the Cuban National Institute of 
Tourism [Instituto Nacional de Turismo] (INTUR), the to& number of 
tourists and their expenditures have been increasing since 1989: 
Year Visitors Expenditures (in $millions) 
1989 326,000 250 
1990 340,000 250 
1991 424,000 287 
1992 492,000 382 
1993 595,320 466 
199422 600,00O(estimate) 56 1 (estimate) 
Espino contends that gross receipts do not accurately reflect the true 
contribution of tourism to the Cuban balance of payments. A better 
measure is net receipts: gross receipts minus the associated hard 
currency imports required as inputs. INTUR studies report that 
between 23 to 64.9 percent of the cost of providing goods and 
services used by tourist and up to 50 percent of the cost of capital 
investment in the tourist sector is paid in hard currency. On average 
within the international tourist industry, the import component is 
calculated to be about 30-38 percent. [Ref. 63: p. 611 Harvard 
University professor Jorge Dominguez calculates the annual net 
currency gain to Cuba in the range of only U.S. $100-300 million. The 
growth potential for the Cuban tourism industry seems positive in the 
1990s?’, Cuban Studies 33, ed. Jorge P&ez-L6pez, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 63- 
64. 
** As reported by Janice Reyes, “Turistas dan la espalda a Miami para viajar a Cuba,” EZ Nuevo Herald, 25 
June 1994,1(A), 8(A). 
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near term, but is not viewed by many experts as boundless. In a 
recent report, La Sociedad Economica concluded: 
Cuba’s current lack of access to significant foreign capital 
and the U.S. tourist market inevitably places a ceiling as to  
how large and sophisticated Cuba’s tourism industry can 
grow. [Ref. 66: p. 1281 
3. Non-Sugar Agriculture Sector 
The ability of the non-sugar agriculture sector in Cuba to realize 
both foodstuff self-sufficiency and export diversification away from 
sugar is crucial to any strategy of economic recovery. Cuba’s 
agricultural advantages include: soils of excellent quality, a benign 
subtropical climate with well-defined rainy seasons and a geographic 
location conducive to trade with its neighbors. The Cuban agricultural 
program requires imported goods such as fertilizers, seeds, herbicides 
and equipment, all of which are scarce or degraded due to lack of 
spare parts and oil products. In 1989, the non-state sector accounted 
for under 17 percent of cultivated land--provided 65 percent of Cuba’s 
tomatoes and other market vegetables, 28 percent of root crops and 
35 percent of plantains. [Ref. 34: pp. 121-1221 Van Sickle and 
Messina assert the lack of advanced technology and limited access to 
production inputs in Cuba appear to be restricting yields and 
production more than land, labor and water [Ref. 67: p. 91. 
a Rice 
Rice is the most important grain in the Cuban diet In 
1989 there was a total of 205,800 hectares devoted to rice production 
Overall total rice production has increased since 1970, and Cuba has 
been producing an average of over 370,000 metric tons of milled rice 
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from 1984-1989. Cuba is not self-sufficient in rice production, and 
must import to satisfy total domestic consumption demands, which 
averaged 585,508 mt between 1984- 1989. Imported volumes have 
remained relatively stable during the past twenty-four years at about 
200,000 metric tons, however, rice has been rationed since the early 
1960s; five pounds per month in 1992. Alvarez and Messina claim 
that the increases in domestic rice production have satisfied the 
expanding requirements resulting from population growth since 
imports have remained relatively stable at 30-40 percent of total 
consumption. [Ref. 68: p. 121 
b. Vegetables 
Cuba was a major supplier of fresh vegetables to the U S .  
market prior to the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. Tomatoes and 
cucumbers were the most significant vegetables imported into the U.S. 
from Cuba, with avocados, peppers, and eggplant also being imported. 
Cuban statistics are limited, but do indicate that Cuba increased the 
area planted in horticultural crops from 91,600 acres in 1970 to 
384,500 acres in 1989. Much of the increase in acreage planted in 
horticultural crops in Cuba occurred in the non-state sector. There is 
no indication of extensive foreign investment in agricultural 
production in Cuba at present, however, Chilean produce shippers are 
said to be preparing to handle the marketing of Cuban fruits and 
vegetables in the European market [Ref. 67: p. 91. 
c. Citrus 
Following the 1959 revolution, Cuba invested heavily to  
develop its citrus industry in order to diversify its sugar-dominated 
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economy and expand exports to trade partners within CEMA. Citrus 
acreage increased from about 30,000 acres before the revolution to 
over 350,000 acres in 1991.23 Cuba ranks as the 14th largest 
producer of citrus in the world, producing about 1.0 million metric 
tons annually. In 1981, CEMA agreed to invest $350 million into the 
further development of the Cuban citrus industry. This investment 
facilitated the introduction of irrigated systems, which led to acreage 
expansion programs. As a result of these programs, the citrus industry 
became one of the largest agricultural sectors in Cuba About 90 
percent of total citrus production is state-owned, and although Cuba 
has considerable technological knowledge, productivity is low. The 
average per-acre yield for bearing trees of all ages was estimated by 
the Economic Research Department of the Florida Department of 
Citrus to be about 110, 901b boxes, which can be compared to the 
Florida average of about 350, 901b boxes. [Ref. 69: p. 1-61 
Most of Cuban citrus production, 44.4 percent of total 
orange production and 56.9 percent of total grapefruit production, is 
used for the fresh juice market and is exported. With the loss of 
import commitments from CEMA countries, Cuba is likely to divert an 
increasing amount of its citrus exports to western markets in search 
of hard currency earnings. Recent investments in the Cuban citrus 
industry by Chile, Israel, Spain and Greece may facilitate access to 
western markets and increase Cuba's overall market share. [Ref. 69: 
pp. 7-10] According to CIA trade statistics, Cuban citrus exports, in 
$U.S., for the period 1989 to 1992 were: 
23 21 percent or 73,500 acres of b e  total is nonbearing citrus acreage. 
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1989 139 million 
1990 150 million (estimate) 
1991 100 million (estimate) 
1992 70 million (estimate) 
d. Tobacco 
Hard currency earned from Cuban cigar exports rank 
behind only sugar, nickel and citrus. Cuba's claim on producing the 
best cigar in the world has recently been weakened by a major 
challenge from the Dominican Republic, a shortage of money and 
recent severe weather crop damage. In 1993, Cuba produced about 
257 million cigars, with 200 million sold on the domestic market and 
the remainder exported, mostly to Europe. According to the CIA 
estimate of cuban trade statistics, Cuban tobacco products earned an 
average of $U.S. 93.6 million from 1985-1989. In 1993, there was a 
disastrous downturn in Cuban tobacco as exports fell 10 million short 
of industry projections. 
Exports of Cuban cigars since 1990: 
1990 80 million 
1991 77 million 
1992 67 million 
1993 57 million 
199424 50 million 
The world market for Cuban "Puros," excluding the U.S., is as many as 
100 million cigars. [Ref. 70: pp. 1 14-1 151 The Cuban tobacco industry 
has also generated limited foreign interest. The French tobacco firm, 
24 As estimated by Cubatabaco Director, Fmcisco Padron. 
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Societe Nationale des Tabacs, was reported to be willing to extend a 
line of credit to Cubatabaco, Cuba's cigar monopoly, in order to aid in 
the purchasing of equipment and supplies thereby ensuring the 
French firm a supply of about 6 million cigars this year [Ref. 71: p. 881. 
4. Energy 
With the exception of bagasse, which is produced and consumed 
by the sugar industry, Cuban output of energy products is quite 
modest. There have been no significant coal deposits found in Cuba 
and hydroelectric resources are limited. The generating capacity of 
the Cuban public service electrical system reported in 1988 was 3.853 
megawatts (MW), with 99.5 percent of this capacity associated with 
thermoelectric plants fired by residual fuel-oil and crude oil. 
Consequently, imported energy products are critical to Cuban 
economic activity. In 1988, total energy imports amounted to about 
2.6 times the amount of domestic energy production. Oil and oil 
products are the most significant Cuban energy imports, satisfylng 94 
percent of Cuba's apparent consumption of oil in 1988. [Ref. 72: pp. 
18-21, 361 Before 1990, Cuba's oil requirement was estimated at 10 
million tons per year. According to Rivero, the primary sources of 
Cuban energy are: 
1. petroleum, 73% 
2. sugarcane bagasse, 24% 
3. firewood, 2% 
4. coal and others. l%.25 
25 NicoW Rivero, "Thoughts on the Cuban Sugar Industry," in Cub in Transition Volume 2: Second 
b n u a l  ?v&tinP - in Miami. Florida. 
Economy (Miami: Florida International University, 1993), 128. 
st 13-15  1992. by the Association for the Study of the Cuban 
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In late August 1990, the Cuban government called for energ? 
conservation measures as a result of a 2 million ton shortfall in Soviet 
oil imports and the lack of hard currency to purchase alternate 
supplies in the world market. Included among the measures imposed 
are: 
1. reducing daily petroleum and fuel oil deliveries to the state 
sector by 50 percent and gasoline deliveries to the private 
sector by 30 percent, 
2. scaling back hours of operation in cement and construction 
material plants: shutting down a nickel processing plant: and 
halting the start-up of a Soviet-built oil refinery, 
3. cutting household electricity consumption by 10 percent, and 
4. implementing a nationwide plan to replace agricultural tractors 
and combines with draft animals. 26 
I t  has been estimated that every kilowatt-hour of energy saved or 
produced in Cuba saves 4.73e in foreign exchange [Ref. 73: p. 1381. 
a. Oil Pmductiorr/oil ExpZoratbn 
Prior to the Soviet collapse, Cuba imported 13 million tons 
of oil and oil products annually. gT 1992, the Castro regime would 
have but 6 million tons of imported oil with which to manage the 
Cuban economy. Daily oil production in Cuba is estimated at 20,000 
barrels per day, accounting for only one-tenth of its daily consumption. 
[Ref. 74: p. 1471 The state-owned oil company, Cuba Petroleum 
(Cupet), exercises exclusive control over all oil production, refining 
26 Jorge P&ez-L6pez, “The Cuban economy: rectification in a changing world,” Q@&.ge Jou mal of 
Fxonomics 16 (March 1992): 122. 
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and distribution in Cuba According to Cupet vice president, Juan 
Fleites Melo, efforts to increase domestic oil production through 
improved technology and increased foreign investment ($U.S. 3 0 
million in 1993) have resulted in Cuba's capacity to produce 1.3 
million to 1.5 million metric tons of oil in 1994. [Ref. 75: p. 1151 In 
June  1994. Fleites Melo lowered Cuba's oil production estimate to 1.1 
million metric tons, still twice the production level of 1991, citing 
recent transport and infrastructure problems as causing the setback 
[Ref. 76: p. 1001. Cuban domestic oil production since 1991 is 
tabulated below: 
1991 550,000 mt 
1992 842,000 mt 
1993 1.1 mmt 
1994 1.1 mmt (estimate) 
In addition, Cuba has explored other alternatives to ease dependence 
on Soviet Oil such as: 1) attempting to become a beneficiary country 
under the San Jose Pact, an agreement whereby Mexico and Venezuela 
offer oil at concessionary terms to Central American and Caribbean 
nations: and 2) offering to process crude oil from Colombia and 
Ecuador in Cuban refineries for export, and obtaining compensation 
for the refining activities in the form of oil products [Ref. 11: p. 1241. 
In early 1991 Cupet granted a six-year contract to a 
consortium of French and Canadian oil companies to drill exploratory 
wells along the Cuban north coast over an area covering 1,800 square- 
kilometers. The majority of Cuban crude oil is heavy with a high sulfur 
content, making it difficult to refine. The high costs associated with 
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oil exploration have prompted the Castro regime to continue its efforts 
to attract foreign investors. Canadian and European companies were 
invited to Cuba in February 1993 to bid on concessions to explore for 
oil within eleven designated blocks covering both onshore and 
offshore sites. Reportedly, the contracts are to run for 25 years and 
involve mutual production responsibilities with the foreign companies 
providing all necessary capital and technology. [Ref. 77: p. 961 In June 
1994, Cupet announced that Sherritt Inc., one of the largest Canadian 
investors in Cuba, had discovered crude oil of a higher quality than any 
previously found in Cuba The well in the Bay of Cardenas could 
produce 3,750 barrels per day. [Ref. 78; p. 871 The Cuban economy 
could experience rapid recovery should future oil exploration in Cuba 
uncover significant oil reserves. Gonzalez comments that even though 
it would take five to seven years to bring a discovery into production, 
the very promise of Cuba becoming a major oil producer would free up 
Western credits and loans to the Cuban government in the interim 
[Ref. 15: p. 251. 
b. NuclearPower 
Perez-upez claims the shift to market prices and 
convertible currencies in Cuban-Soviet trade in energy products is 
likely to accelerate efforts to alter the structure of energy supply, by 
emphasizing alternate energy sources, especially nuclear power [Ref. 
72: pp. 17, 181. In 1974, Fidel Castro announced that the 
construction of the Juragria nuclear power complex would begin in 
1977-78. The reactors for the J-a plant are Soviet-designed 
pressurized water reactors with 440 MW electricity generation 
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capacity, known as WER-440. [Ref. 72: p. 351 The Jura@a nuclear 
plant was expected to supply 15 percent of Cuba’s electrical power 
needs. The first reactor is apparently more than 90 percent 
complete, however, any further construction appears to be indefinitely 
postponed due to lack of money to pay Russian technicians and fund 
modifications required to meet international atomic energy safety 
standards. [Ref. 79: p. 1431 Cuba’s ability to build, complete and 
operate the Juragiia plant and others depends on =-Soviet aid and 
assistance, and will remain at an impasse unless assistance from 
another nation such as Japan or Germany are obtained. [Ref. 80: pp. 
107, 1081 Despite the international concern over the plant’s safety 
and the nuclear accident at Chemobyl, the long-term commitment of 
the Cuban government to nuclear power does not seem to have been 
affected [Ref. 80: p. 1001. During a portion of his 26 July 1986 
national address Fidel Castro stated his view on pursuing nuclear 
power: 
... for our nation, the use of this new energy source, nuclear 
energy, is essential, since we do not have any other 
alternative. 
Perez-Mpez surmises that the marginal cost of producing 
electricity in the nuclear power plants being built in Cuba would be 
lower than that in oil-fired thermoelectric plants. The shift to nuclear 
power would reduce consumption of oil and oil products, which now 
have to be procured using hard tun-en~y.2~ According to Cuban 
officials, each 440 Mw nuclear reactor will have the potential to 
27 In April 1994, the ratification phase of an agreement reached in December 1993 between Cuba and 
Russia to exchange 1 million tons of raw sugar for 2.5 million tons of oil had been concluded. 
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displace thermoelectric generation capacity consuming 600,000 
metric tons of oil products per m u m .  Nuclear power may offer Cuba 
the only realistic possibility to reduce dependency on imported oil and 
oil products in the medium term. It  will not reduce the overall 
dependence on imported energy, however, as hardware for the 
application of nuclear technologies is imported, and so are fissionable 
materials. [Ref. 72: p. 37-39] 
5. Nickel 
Cuba has the fourth largest reserves of nickel in the world, over 
900 million tons of probable reserves, and is the sixth largest 
producer of nickel. Its ores, however, are of low-to-average grade 
which are expensive to process. The average world production cost in 
January 1993 was about U.S. $6500 per ton. Assuming an average 
world market price of U.S. $6500 per ton for 1992, Cuban nickel 
profits for that same year are estimated to be U.S. $200-220 million. 
Estimates of Cuban nickel production are roughly 35,000-45,000 tons 
for 1993 close to that produced in 1992 and 1991. Cuba could 
conceivably remain in the world nickel market if production costs are 
reduced and efficiency improved. [Ref. 811 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were both chief 
buyers of Cuban nickel and the main source of many supply inputs. 
Cuban nickel production has an installed capacity of 70,000 metric 
tons per year. All three Cuban nickel plants, Moa, Punta Gorda and 
Nicaro, are said to make an operating profit even at low nickel prices 
of around $2.10 per pound (U.S. $4200 per ton) but Moa is the most 
profitable because of its low fuel input. A fourth plant is under 
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construction at Las Camariocas whose design capacity is 30,000 
metric tons per year. The Las Camariocas plant is 70 percent 
complete and is designed to operate with about 5 metric tons of crude 
oil per ton of nickel produced compared to the 15-20 tons of oil 
required at the other three plants. [Ref. 82: p. 1481 Mining is 
necessarily a long term venture but Cuba has the advantage of an 
extremely prospective terrain, an extraordinq level of geological 
knowledge built up over 35 years, a well educated workforce, and 
there a sufficient number of mining professionals. [Ref. 831 
Cuban nickel output in thousands of tons according to the 







Another expanding arena for Cuban trade is biomedical 
technology. A concrete result of Cuba’s well respected medical system 
has been the development of at least two products that have potential 
in the international market--a Hepatitis B vaccine and Streptokinase, 
an anti-stroke medicine. Cuban officials are well aware of the 
complexities of breaking into an international drug market dominated 
by United States and European multinational companies, but they are 
formulating market strategies focused primarily on the poorer 
countries, notably in Latin America. The success of just one key 
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. . . 
product could significantly boost this sector of Cuba's economy which 
is estimated to earn $200 million a year in hard currency. [Ref. 84: pp. 
142-1441 There were early quality control problems in production of 
some Cuban meningitis B vaccines sold to Brazil. In spite of this, the 
present effectiveness of the meningitis vaccine is estimated at 85 
percent, which is considerably above the competing products with a 
reported effectiveness closer to 65 percent. [Ref. 21: p. 4131 
7. Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign investment in joint ventures has been permitted in Cuba 
since 1982. By January 1992, there were fifty-five joint venture or 
production-sharing operations underway in Cuba The majority were 
in tourism, but during 1991, they expanded into biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, nickel, oil, textiles, construction, sugar derivatives, 
transportation, cosmetics and food processing, with one-hundred 
more such ventures under negotiation. In November 1993, Carlos 
Martinez, president of Cuba's Chamber of Commerce, reported there 
were 481 foreign companies with offices in Cuba.. Benglesdorf 
characterizes the policies undertaken by the Castro regime with 
regard to establishing joint ventures in Cuba as "In effect, ... a de facto 
transition to a mixed economy." [Ref. 52: p. 1691 According to 
Montes, foreign exchange receipts from foreign direct investment 
remained fairly constant at $50 million per year from 1989- 1992 [Ref. 
45: p. 351. As part of the foreign investment incentive package 
proposed by the Castro regime, investors are allowed to import foreign 
management teams, however, the Cuban government retains the right 
to reallocate labor to and from joint ventures. I t  also retains the right 
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to select the pool of domestic workers from which the foreign 
enterprise may hire. [Ref. 21: p. 412) [Ref. 65: p. 8221. 
Lasaga believes the success of the so-called “maquiladoras” in 
Mexico could be replicated in Cuba, particularly in the area of textiles, 
electronics and pharmaceuticals. Like Mexico, Cuba has the advantage 
of close proximity to the U.S. market. Lasaga also notes that free 
capital repatriation could encourage foreign investors to make only 
short-term investments that would maximize their returns, instead of 
longer-term projects that would be driven by market fundamentals. 
[Ref. 85: pp. 309-3 101 Foreign direct investment agreements have 
also served as alternative measures by which Cuba may service its 
foreign debt. Mexico’s Grupo Domos Internacional has acquired a 49 
percent stake in Entelcuba, the Cuban telephone monopoly, with a 
Domos official noting that it is paying U.S. $1.44 billion for its share, of 
which about U.S. $200 million will be obtained in a swap deal 
liquidating Cuba’s debt with Mexico. Domos will be investing a further 
US. $740 million over seven years in modernizing Entelcuba. [Ref. 86: 
p. 51 
Glazer expresses the irony of the “bifurcation” of the Cuban 
economy, in part caused by the foreign investment policies of Fidel 
castro: 
By not permitting market activity within the domestic 
economy while selling off chunks of the island to foreign 
investors, the government has taken a path that benefits 
those who least support the revolution [Ref. 65: p. 8231. 
Baloyra sees the very generous terms offered by the Cuban government 
as having two negative effects in the short term: 1) Cuban participation 
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in profits is but a fraction of what it could be if the country did not find 
itself in such a weak position, and; 2) extensive concessions in 
taxation, profit repatriation, and the provision of infrastructure 
reduced national participation in the surplus generated by these 
activities and deflated the net diffusion effects of this investment in 
the domestic sector. [Ref. 20: p. 171 
8. The Black Market 
The economic function of the distribution sector in Cuba is to 
transfer goods and services from producers to consumers. Within 
Cuba there are three interrelated factors that play a key role in the 
functioning of the distribution sector: 
1. the rationing system, 
2. alternative markets, and 
3. informal exchanges. 28 
The drastic reduction of imported consumer goods and the lack of 
domestic substitutes has caused the list of consumer goods which are 
now rationed by the Cuban government to be expanded to include even 
the most basic items, such as aspirin, milk and eggs. By rationing 
consumption, the Cuban government attempts to guarantee the 
satisfaction of basic needs independent of levels of disposable income 
resulting from salaries and wages [Ref. 9: p. 131. For the majority of 
Cubans, however, the state is unable to meet its commitment, and 
whatever cannot be procured by barter must be purchased, in dollars, 
on the black market. 
.. lume 2; 28 Roger R. Betancourt, “The Distribution Sector in a CPE Cuba,” in Cuba in Transition Vo 
Cuban Economy (Miami: Florida International University, 1993), 21 1. 
nd Annual Meet in? in Miami. Florida. A u a t  13 -15. 1992. by the Association for the Study of the 
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The black market, often referred to as the "second economy," 
reflects a disparity between supply and demand. More importantly, 
according to Eckstein, the existence of the Cuban black market 
reflects the failure of Fidel Castro's rectification policies to keep the 
supply of goods available through legitimate channels in line with the 
available money supply. It also reflects the state's inability to impose 
its will when in conflict with valued social concerns. [Ref. 16: p. 821 
As put forth by Perez-Upez, some of the characteristics of CPEs which 
account for the "pervasiveness and dynamism" of their second 
economies include: 
1. government ownership of the means of production, 
2. tautness and rigidity of central plans, and 
3. suppressed inflation. 29 
In some cases, the second economy may complement the official, 
centrally-planned economy or "first economy," and correct some of its 
failures [Ref. 87: p. 1851. The black market can also result in 
economic distortions that spawn additional, less desirable 
consequences. 
The unavailability of consumer goods through official channels 
has led to excess liquidity and a lack of incentives to work, thereby 
lowering productivity [Ref. 14: p. 8281. Montes estimates that Cubans 
spend 50-70 percent of their money on the black market [Ref. 45: p. 
311. Cuba has nearly 12 billion excess pesos in circulation, and Cubans 
29 Jorge Perez-L6pez, "The Cuban Second Economy: Methodological and Practical Issues Related to 
Quantification," in Cuba in Trans ition Vo lume 2: Seco nd Annual Meet ing in Miami. Florida. &gust 13- 
15. 1992. by the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (Miami: Florida International 
University, 1993), 187. 
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find the excess nearly impossible to spend because there is so little to 
buy [Ref. 88: p. 871. Unofficial estimates are that $400 million is 
currently circulating in the black market, with prices on the black 
market 10-20 times higher than at state distribution centers [Ref. 89: 
p. 951. Ritter argues that under these conditions both the officially 
tolerated and the illegal components of the informal sector are likely 
very large [Ref. 31: p. 1221. The high level of private economic 
incentives for informal sector activities can only be countered by 
increasing the costs of informal sector participation, presumably 
through a higher level of repression or moral persuasion30 [Ref. 90: p. 
2131. 
9. The Dollarization of the Cuban Economy 
The possession of U S .  dollars, forbidden since 1961, became 
legal in Cuba on August 14, 1993. Cubans can now spend U.S. dollars, 
meaning that those who either earn money abroad or have money sent 
to them by friends or relatives will be able to buy goods in hard 
currency shops that are not available in state stores, which stock only 
rationed goods. With these measures, the Castro regime hopes to 
encourage Cuban exiles to send millions of dollars, that will eventually 
add to the hard currency holdings of the government, to desperate 
relatives. It also hopes to drain the U.S. currency from the Cuban 
black market. [Ref. 91: p. 1341 Alonso considers this logic as being 
flawed, since in the first round of circulation the influx of dollars go 
30 On May 2,1994, Fidel Castro announced that the government would confiscate all property illegally 
acquired by black marketeers. Just one month earlier, operation "Giron 94," resulted in hundreds of Cubans 
being fined, warned or charged with corruption, for their black market activities. 
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directly to the black market anyway. I t  is not until the fourth or fifth 
round of circulation that the Cuban government realizes any benefit, 
thus forcing the Cuban government to print more pesos; fueling 
inflation. [Ref. 491 
The introduction of the dollar as legal tender, and the associated 
parallel market it creates, results in two phenomena with which the 
a b a n  government has no experience--inflation and an affluent and 
“independent” social class [Ref. 92: p. 1461. Andres Oppenheimer 
theorizes that Castro risks losing political control over a large sector of 
the population that will no longer depend on the Cuban government 
for its livelihood. Those Cubans with access to dollars will evolve into 
a new privileged class. [Ref. 93: p. 1321 For the strategy of Fidel 
Castro to work, the government will have to remain the exclusive 
banker and retailer of all items that will be allowed to be purchased 
with dollars. I t  must ensure the replenishment of goods that can be 
purchased at state-owned dollar stores, The Castro regime must also 
implement measures by which to control inflation and retard 
devaluation of the Cuban peso. [Ref. 92: p. 1461 Dominguez views the 
dollarization of the Cuban economy as “a very big step,” because for 
the first time, “the government has renounced the political right to 
intervene in an economic transaction.” Such a relaxation policy has 
made some officials fearful that professionals (doctors and engineers) 
who spent years studying may now leave their jobs for less prestigious 
but more profitable positions and activities where the access to dollars 
is much greater. [Ref. 94: p. 1371 
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10. Cuba's Foreign Debt 
Cuba has amassed a foreign debt in excess of $39 billion, of 
which an estimated $7 billion is owed to the Paris Club and the 
balance to the former Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe 
[Ref. 44: p. 1061. In 1992, Alonso and Rathbone estimated the Cuban 
foreign debt to be 1.6 times the Cuban GSP for 1989, representing a 
per capita debt of over $3,900 [Ref. 35: p. 1181. Zimbalist notes that 
Cuba has also been seriously affected by a steady devaluation of the U.S. 
dollar against the currencies of other OECD economies since mid- 
1985. According to Zimabalist, 87 percent of the Cuban foreign debt 
is denominated in nondollar currencies, yen and European currencies. 
Many of these currencies have appreciated against the U.S. dollar by 
over 40 percent since mid-1985 and continue to do so, and as a result 
the dollar value of Cuba's foreign debt has increased proportionately. 
[Ref. 13: pp.156-1571 In 1986 Cuba suspended its payments on the $7 
billion it owed to Western nations [Ref.43: p. 1331. A repayment 
agreement with creditors is urgent since Cuba must now conduct most 
of its trade on cash-only terms. In addition, new credits are required 
for investments aimed at increasing both productivity and foreign 
exchange earnings [Ref. 31: p. 1371. 
11. External Policies of Regional/International Actors 
The most widely debated external policy affecting Cubaremains 
the U.S. imposed trade embargo. On J a n u q  3, 1961, the U. S. 
severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. The following year Cuba 
nationalized American property valued at approximately $U.S. 1.8 
billion [Ref. 95: pp. 102-1041. The U.S. State Department believes it 
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can best foster an environment for peaceful change in Cuba by 
continuing to isolate the Castro regime diplomatically, politically and 
economically until basic human rights are respected and democratic 
reforms enacted [Ref. 96: p. 5771. U.S. policy has remained virtually 
unchanged for over 30 years and is considered by its advocates, 
including Ambassador Michael Skol, to be a valuable bargaining chip: 
If we were to change our policy now, what leverage would 
remain to pressure that regime toward freedom and 
democratic openings [Ref. 971. 
Ritter argues that Cuba can strengthen its position to benefit from 
normalization with the U.S. by establishing a successful export- 
oriented economic structure and trading system [Ref. 31: p. 1441. 
However, the U.S. embargo, intensified by recent legislation, prohibits 
such events from occumng in the near term. The Cuban Democracy 
Act (CDA), signed on October 23 1992 by then President Bush, has as 
its principal provisions the ban of most U.S. subsidiary trade with Cuba 
and excludes any vessel that stops in Cuba from entering U S .  ports for 
180 days thereafter [Ref. 95: p. 1041. In addition, section 1704 of the 
CDA authorizes the President to suspend foreign assistance to any 
country that provides assistance, including loans, leases or credits at 
non-market rates to Cuba [Ref. 98). 
During the post-Cold War period international support of U.S. 
Cuban policy and Cuba’s isolation has waned. In late-1992, United 
Nations Resolution 4719 called for the termination of the U.S. 
economic, commercial and financial blockade against Cuba The U.S. 
voted against the resolution and received support from only Israel and 
Romania. In mid-December 1993, the Caribbean Community 
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(Caricom) established a Caricom-Cuba joint commission, which 
declared as its objective the strengthening of ties through the 
identification and promotion of opportunities for cooperation in the 
economic, social, cultural and technological fields. The accord 
creating the commission identified 24 priority areas, including trade, 
fanning, fisheries, biotechnology, and human resources development. 
[Ref. 99: pp. 1-21 Many high-ranking officials of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) have informally discussed the reinsertion of 
Cuba into the O M ,  and may soon elect to append the issue to the 
organization’s formal agenda. Other nations, representing a wide 
spectrum of political and economic ideologies, have established 
economic relations with Castro’s Cuba either through joint ventures or 
other bilateral agreements. Cuba has thus far succeeded in securing 
economic commitments of varying degrees from such countries as 
Canada, France, Spain, Mexico, Russia, North Korea, China, Vietnam, 
and the United Kingdom. 
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IV. SPECIFICATIONS OF THE FORECAST 
A. STATES OF NATURE 
The hypotheses put forth in a Bayesian analysis are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive and serve to specifl the possible "states of 
nature", or outcomes, with respect to aparticular issue [Ref. 4: p. 851. 
For the purposes of this study the systemic forces at work in the 
environment are such that the possible states of nature characterizing 
the Cuban economy are: a centrally planned economy (CPE), a mixed 
economy (MIX) or a predominantly market economy (MKT). Each of 
the possible outcomes is assigned a prior probability representing the 
assessor's degree of belief concerning the truth of the various 
hypotheses [Ref. 4: 561. Based on the recent works of Mesa-Lago and 
Fabian (1993), Ritter (1993), and Gonzalez and Ronfeldt (1994) the 
following prior probabilities are assigned to the economic direction of 
the Cuban economy in the short-to-medium term: 
Probability 
P(CPE) = .20 
P(M1X.I = .65 
P(MKT) = .15 
Justification 
(the fonner dependence upon Soviet subsidy 
and the CEMA trade bloc has left Cuba without 
economic support in time of crisis) 
(the bifurcation of the Cuban economy and the 
concern for preserving social gains) 
(the steadfast reluctance of Fidel Castro to 
accept market reforms and capitalism) 
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B. TARGETVARIABLES 
Target variables, within a Bayesian context, represent those 
factors, pieces of evidence or activities readily translated into events 
from which revised conditional probabilities of the possible 
hypotheses are assessed. According to fundamental probability theory, 
two events are independent if the probability assigned to one event is 
unaffected by the knowledge that the other event has occurred. The 
conditionally independent form of Bayes’ Theorem can only be used if 
it can be justified mathematically, often an arduous theorectical 
exercise. In the case of economic or political applications, prior 
events may in fact be essential to formulating a valid probability 
assessment and therefore, using conditional dependence represents a 
more accurate and realistic approach. [Ref. 4: pp. 144-1501 There are 
several target variables. dependent on other activities, that are 
relevant to the possible hypotheses regarding the Cuban economy. 
Although several more could be postulated, six target variables 
assumed to be conditionally dependent have been chosen: 
1. Foreign Exchange Earnings, 
2. Import Substitution, 
3. Political Control, 
4. Economic Refoms, 
5. Financial Integration into Global Financial Community, and 
6. External Policies of International and Regional Actors. 
Each of the target variables is derived from the economic and political 
considerations previously examined. The analytical translation of 
these variables into relevant events (El-E6) is discussed below. 
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1. Event 1- Foreign Exchange Earnings Exceed $4 bn. 
Cuban foreign exchange earnings are a direct calculation of the 
revenues generated by both the commodity and service sectors added 
to foreign direct investments. The earning potential of major Cuban 
exports such as sugar and nickel will depend not only on production 
output but also on world market prices, unless more favorable bilateral 
agreements materialize. Increased foreign direct investment in the 
form of joint ventures may partially compensate for the low world 
prices of Cuban commodities particularly if selected industries become 
more efficient and benefit from long-term capital. 
2. Event 2 - Import Substitution Meets 50% of Consumption 
The most significant import substitution efforts undertaken by 
the Castro regime address energy and foodstuff self-sufficiency. The 
lack of energy inputs severely curtails the production output of Cuba’s 
most important industries. In addition, regularly scheduled electricity 
blackouts throughout the country serve as a daily reminder of the 
unabated crisis conditions, and may soon begin to negatively affect the 
lucrative tourism sector. A significant discovery and refinement of 
Cuban oil reserves or the completion and successful operation of the 
Juragiia nuclear plant could lessen energy rationing restrictions, but 
neither is expected in the near term. The satisfaction of consumer 
demand for foodstuffs represents a prominent catalyst of civil unrest. 
Should Cuba earn sufficient foreign exchange to purchase 30 to 40 
percent of its foodstuffs abroad, and should import substitution meet 
50 percent of domestic consumption, the remaining 20 to 10 percent 
can be absorbed by private production or the black market. 
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3. Event 3 - Political Control is Maintained by Castro 
Maintaining political control within Cuba involves the Castro 
regime being able to respond quickly and decisively to civil or military 
challenges. Central to this issue is the ability of the Castro regime to 
sustain its claim of legitimacy in the face of alternate claims from 
outside the regime. Activities that threaten political control include 
the increased influence and organization of domestic opposition such 
as dissident groups and the Catholic Church, and escalating public 
demonstrations protesting economic conditions [Ref. 96: p. 3661. 
Black market activity may also provide information indicative of the 
potential for civil discontent or disobedience. Should staple consumer 
goods become increasingly scarce, even on the black market, the 
unofficial exchange rate (peso/dollar) will rise, reflecting inflationary 
pressures. Inflation of black market prices left unchecked could 
ultimately result in desparate popular actions, such as food riots or the 
looting of government wharehouses and stores. 
4. Event 4 - Economic Reforms Result in Less Centralization 
The relevant economic policies include those affecting 
institutional structures, as well as both internally and externally 
oriented policies [Ref. 34: p. 191. The internal and external economic 
policies that result in less centralization include: liberalizing prices, 
privatizing state industry, instituting tax reform, adopting a realistic 
exchange rate. restructuring incentive policies, reducing state 
subsidies, and encouraging private enterprise. The tradeoff is a loss of 
state control over the allocation of resources and economic activity, 
from which income distribution inequalities result. 
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5. Event 5 - Inteeation into the Global Financial Community 
A major obstacle thwarting the intergration of Cuba into the 
global financial community is its inability to service a $7 billion debt 
owed to the Paris Club. The effect of Cuba paying its foreign debt is to 
reduce the foreign exchange available for imports and investments. 
For Cuba to cover interest and principal on its debt an increased trade 
surplus or a renegotiated repayment schedule is necessary. Cuba is 
not a member of the International Monetary Fund nor the World Bank 
and therefore is unable to secure desperately needed financial credits. 
Prospective lender-nations remain skeptical of Cuba's economic and 
political future and are reluctant to extend credit other than in the 
form of investments in joint ventures, or "debt swap" deals as 
accomplished by Mexico. Should significant oil reserves be discovered 
in Cuba, access to financial credits would be considerably facilitated. 
6. Event 6 - Foreign hade/Aid Policies Benefit Cuba 
The external foreign policies of international and regional actors 
such as the U.S., U.N., OAS, and CARIBCOM could quite literally throw 
Cuba a lifeline. Such action would entail development aid similar to 
that pledged to the economic reconstruction of Haiti following the 
return of exiled president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in mid-October 
1994. The most debated foreign policy issue remains the lifting of the 
U.S. trade embargo, which undoubtedly would increase foreign 
investment but not necessarily eliminate tension between the two 
countries, considering the $1.8 billion in expropriated properties 
claimed by American businesses and the $7 billion claimed by Cuban 
exiles. 
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C. SCENARIO FORECASTS 
The scenario forecasts assume the continuation of Fidel Castro in 
a position of unchallenged political and economic leadership into at 
least the medium term (5-8 years). Under the first five scenarios, U.S. 
policy toward normalizing relations with Cuba and lifting the embargo 
remains unchanged, as does Cuba’s indefinite moratorium on the 
servicing of its foreign debt. Under these conditions, Event 5 and 
Event 6 can be excluded from Scenarios I-V. 
A word of caution is necessary with respect to the specific time 
order of relevant events. If no specific time order can be specified for 
the events under consideration, different orders will represent 
different composite events and one should expect to calculate 
different final products for the different probability judgements 
assigned [Ref. 4: p. 1681. Event 1 through Event 6 have been placed in 
a logical order of succession without regard for the discrete time 
intervals between successive events. Event 1 through Event 4 are 
interchangeable: however, Event 5 and Event 6 most likely would 
succeed Event 1 through Event 4 regardless of their order. All 
assigned probabilities are subjective, and are intended to appeal to the 
prescience of the reader. 
Due to the initial definition of Event 4, the conditional 
probability, P(E4IH1), is assigned a low value and factors to 
significantly decrease P(CPE) regardless of the sequence of relevant 
events. For this study Event 4 is considered an applicable variable to 
the direction of the Cuban economy, and therefore has been included 
in each scenario. 
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1. Scenario I-- Events Occur 1-2-3-4 
Scenario I reflects the limitations of a Cuban CPE with respect to 
earning foreign exchange receipts in excess of $4 billion: considerably 
more favorable conditions exist under a mixed or market economy. 
The sequence of events is ordered El-E2-E3-E4. Table 1A lists the  
prior probability of each hypothesis, the conditional probabilities 
associated with the sequence of events, and the revised probabilities 
Table 1A. Assigned Probabilities for Scenario I 
The generalized trends of the Cuban economy subsequent to the given 
sequence of relevant events for Scenario I are depicted in Figure 1. 











-WE - MIX - MKT 
Figure 1. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario I 
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As each relevant event occurs the probability of each hypothesis 
(CPE, M E ,  MKT) is recalculated (revised) using Bayes’ theorem. 
These results are listed in Table 1B. and correspond to data points 
which determine the revised probability graph in Figure 1.  
Event P(CPE) P ( M W  P(MKT) 
NONE .200 .650 .150 
El .025 .73 1 .244 
E2 .015 .677 -308 
E3 .012 .653 -334 
E4 .002 .598 -400 
Table 1B. Revised Probabilities for Scenario I 
Under the conditions of Scenario I the assigned probability of each 
hypothesis was affected by the associated sequence of events as 
follows: P(CPE) decreased by 99.1%; P(M1X) decreased by 8%; and 
P(MKT) increased by 167%. 
2. Scenario II-- Events Occur 4-3-2-1 
Scenario I1 considers the same pretense as in Scenario I, but 
instead assumes the events occur in reverse order. The sequence of 
relevant events is thus ordered E4-E3-E2-E1. Similar to the previous 
case, Table 2A lists the prior probability of each hypothesis, the 
conditional probabilities associated with the sequence of events, and 
the revised probabilities calculated after the sequence has occurred. 
1 .20 .10 -40 .25 
2 .65 .65 .65 .45 
3 .15 .85 -85 .55 
.25 .006 
.40 .620 
S O  -374 
Table 2A. Assigned Probabilities for Scenario I1 
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The generalized trends of the Cuban economy susequent to the given 
sequence of relevant events for Scenario I1 are shown in Figure 2. 
I Revised Prob. Graph 
s” 0.5 - -  
9 0.4 -- (II - MKT 
Event 
Figure 2. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario II 
As before, the revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of 
each relevant event have been calculated and appear in Table 2B. 
Event P(CPE) P(MJm P(MKT) 
NONE .200 ,650 .150 
E4 -035 -74 1 .224 
E3 .020 .702 .277 
E2 .011 .667 .322 
El -006 -620 -374 
Table 2B. Revised Probabilities for Scenario II 
Under the hypothetical conditions of Scenario 11: P(CPE) decreased by 
97%; P(MIX) decreased by 4.6%; and P(MKT) increased by 149%. 
3. Scenario III- Events Occur 3-4-2-1 
Scenario I11 considers the conditions under which both political 
control and decentralization are less likely to occur coincident with a 
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CPE. Under this scenario the Cuban government would fail to  provide 
the most basic foodstuffs or no longer guarantee the social gains of the 
revolution. As a result, civil opposition would increase its demands for 
more market reforms and less centralization. The sequence of 
relevant events is ordered E3-E4-EZ-E1. As before, listed in Table 3A 
are the prior, conditional, and revised probabilities. 
Rev. Prob. 
j Pwj) P(E31Hj) P(E4IE3&Hj) P(ElIE&E3&Hj) P ( E ~ I E ~ & U ~ Z E ~ & H ~ )  of Hj 
............................................................................................................ 
1 .20 .40 .20 .25 .25 -018 
2 .65 .60 -40 -45 -40 .522 
3 -15 .80 -75 -55 S O  .460 
Table 3A. Assigned Probabilities for Scenario 111 
The generalized trends of the Cuban economy subsequent to the given 
sequence of relevant events for Scenario I11 are depicted in Figure 3. 
Revised Prob. Graph 
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Figure 3. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario III 
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The revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of each 
relevant event appear in Table 3B. 
Event P(CPE) p ( M m  P(MKT)- 
.............................................................. 
NONE .200 .650 .150 
E3 .136 -66 1 .203 
Ex .06 1 -595 .344 
El -032 .568 .400 
E2 .018 .522 .460 
Table 3B. Revised Probabilities for Scenario III 
Under the hypothetical conditions of Scenario 111: P(CPE) decreased by 
91%; P(MIX) decreased by 19.7%; and P(MKT) increased by 207%. 
4. Scenario N-- Events Occur 2-3-4-1 
Scenario IV reflects the condition under which import 
substitution efforts to meet 50 percent of consumption needs are not 
likely to succeed in the near term regardless of the economic system 
in place. The sequence of relevant events is ordered E2-E3-E4-E1. 
Similar to the previous cases, Table 4A lists the prior probability of 
each hypothesis, the conditional probabilities associated with the 
sequence of events, and the revised probabilities calculated after the 
Table 4A. Assigned Probabilities for Scenario IV 
The generalized trends of the Cuban economy subsequent to the given 
sequence of relevant events for Scenario IV are depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario N 
The revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of each 
relevant event appear in Table 4B. 
Event P(CPE) P(MIX) P(MKT) 
NONE .200 .650 .150 
E2 .011 .734 .254 
E3 .009 .7 1 1 .279 
E4 .004 .590 -405 
El .002 -543 .455 
Table 4B. Revised Probabilities for Scenario IV 
Under the hypothetical conditions of Scenario IV: P(CPE) decreased by 
99%; P(MIX) decreased by 16.5%; and P(MKT) increased by 203%. 
.............................................................. 
5. Scenario V- Equiprobable Hypotheses 
Scenario V assumes that each of the three hypotheses has an 
equal probability of occurring, i.e., P(CPE) = P(MIX) = P(MKT) = 0.333. 
Such an equiprobable occurrence is most unlikely in the case of Cuba, 
however, it will be examined to illustrate an initial lack of information 
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or intuition. The condition represents an assessor's judgment that the 
situation is independent of the probabilistic outcome of each economic 
system prior to the sequence of relevant events. The remaining 
assigned probabilities are identical to Scenario I as is the sequence of 
relevant events, which is ordered El-E2-E3-E4. Listed in Table 5A 
are the prior, conditional, and revised probabilities. 
Rev. Prob. 
j Pwj) P(E1IHj) P@zlEl&Hj) P(E31E2&EI&Hj) P(QIE3&E2&El&Hj) of Hj 
............................................................................................................ 
1 .333 -05 -35 -70 .10 .002 
2 .333 .45 -55 -80 .65 -256 
-75 .90 .85 .742 3 .333 -65 
Table 5A. Assigned Probabilities for Scenario V 
The generalized trends of the Cuban for Scenario V appear in Figure 5. 











TI - MKT 
Figure 5. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario V 
The revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of each 
relevant event appear in Table 5B. 
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Event P(CPE) P(MU0 P(MKT) 
NONE .333 .333 .333 
El .043 .39 1 .565 
E2 .023 .329 .648 
E3 .019 .305 .676 
E4 .002 .256 -742 
Table 5B. Revised Probabilities for Scenario V 
Under the hypothetical conditions of Scenario V: P(CPE) decreased by 
99.4%; P(MIX) decreased by 23.1%; and P(MKT) increased by 122.8%. 
6. Scenario VI- A Road to Recovery 
Scenario VI is identical to Scenario I, with the additions of 
Event 5 and Event 6. This scenario incorporates the conditions that 
allow for Cuba’s foreign debt to come under control and the external 
trade policies of other nations and organizations to significantly benefit 
Cuba; neither is expected in the near term. Such a situation could 
arise as the Cuban economy displayed signs of sustainable growth. 
Global perceptions of political and economic risk would be replaced by 
estimates of expected recovery. The sequence of relevant events is, 
ordered El-E2-E3-E4-E5-E6. Table 6A lists the prior probability of 
each hypothesis, and the associated conditional probabilities. 
Table 6A. Assigned Probabilities for Scenario VI 
The generalized trends of the Cuban economy subsequent to the given 
sequence of relevant events for Scenario VI are depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario VI 
The revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of each 
relevant event appear in Table 6B. 
Event P(CPE) P(MD0 P(MKT) ............................................................... 
NONE .200 .650 .150 
El .025 -73 1 -244 
E2 .015 -677 .308 
E3 ,012 -653 .334 
E4 .002 -598 .400 
E5 .oo 1 -528 -47 1 
E6 .oo 1 .465 -534 
Table 6B. Revised Probabilities for Scenario VI 
Under the hypothetical conditions of Scenario VI: P(CPE) decreased by 
99.6%: P(MIX) decreased by 28.4%; and P(MKT) increased by 255.7%. 
7. Scenario VII-- An Economic Lifeline 
Scenario VII considers the same pretense as Scenario VI, but 
instead assumes the events occur in reverse order. This scenario 
represents a concerted effort by the international financial community 
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and other nations and organizations to actively perpetuate the 
economic recovery of Cuba. In essence, an economic lifeline would be 
thrown to the Castro regime. The likelihood of such a coordinated 
effort prior to any major economic reforms within Cuba is low. The 
sequence of relevant events is ordered E6-E5-E4-E3-E2-E 1. Table 7A 
lists the prior probability of each hypothesis, and the conditional 
probabilities associated with the sequence of events. 








Figure 7. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario VII 
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The revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of each 
relevant event appear in Table 7B. 
Event P(CPE) P(MIX) P(MKT) 
NONE .200 -650 -150 
E6 .lo3 .667 .23 1 
E5 .07 1 .643 -286 
E4 -019 -643 .338 
E3 .016 .618 -366 
E2 .013 .590 .396 
El .011 -560 .429 
Table 7B. Revised Probabilities for Scenario VII 
Under the hypothetical conditions of Scenario VI: P(CPE) decreased by 
94.5%; P(M1X) decreased by 13.8%; and P(MKT) increased by 186%. 
Before interpreting the scenario forecasts and formulating any 
conclusions, the probability assessments require a sensitivity analysis. 
D. SENSITIVTY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis is used to investigate the extent to which the 
revised probability of a hypothesis is influenced by any particular 
conditional probability. The sensitivity of a forecast to any assigned 
probability can be determined by varying the probability of interest, 
recalculating the revised probabilities, comparing these values to the 
original set of probabilities, and evaluating any significant differences 
that result. Considerable variance between the two sets of revised 
probabilities would require additional justification, analysis or  
information to ascertain the optimum value for the conditional 
probability in question. [Ref. 5: pp. 99-102) 
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1. The Foreign Exchange Earnings Under a CPE 
In each of the scenarios discussed previously, the foreign 
exchange earning potential of a centrally planned economy was 
assessed to be significantly lower than that of a mixed or 
predominantly market economy. To demonstrate the sensitivity of a 
forecast to the earning potential of a CPE, a value higher than 
conditionally warranted is used to calculate a new set of revised 
probabilities. Consider Scenario I with the condition that the 
occurrence of Cuban foreign exchange earnings exceeding $4 billion 
is. by contrast, most probable under a CPE. How is the forecast of 
Scenario I affected if all other conditional probabilities are unchanged? 
Listed in Table 8A are the assigned prior, and conditional 
probabilities, with the value for P(ElIH1) appearing in bold italics . 
Rev. Prob. 
j P(Hj) P(E1IHj) P(E21EI&Hj) P(E31E2&EI&Hj) P(E%IE3&E2&E1&Hj) of Hj 
1 .20 .85 .35 -70 .10 .0290 
2 .65 .45 .55 .80 .65 S819 
3 .15 -65 -75 .90 .85 .3891 
Table 8A. Probabilities for Sensitivity Analysis of P(ElIH1) 
The revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of each 
relevant event have been recalculated and appear below in Table 8B. 
Event P(CPE) P(MW POVIKT) 
NONE .200 .650 .150 
El .304 -522 .174 
E2 .203 .548 .249 
E3 .176 .545 -279 
E4 -029 .58 1 -389 
Table 8B. Revised Probabilities for P(E1IH1) = .85 
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The sensitivity of the Scenario I forecast to the conditional probability, 
P(ElIH1) = .85, is evident upon examining the revised probabilities of a 
CPE in Table 8B up to the occurrence of Event 3 and comparing them 
with corresponding values for P(CPE) listed in Table 1A. With the 
condition that P(E1IH1) = -85, P(CPE) decreases by only 12% after Event 
3 has occurred, compared to a decrease of 93.8% calculated for 
Scenario I. The revised generalized trends of the Cuban economy 
subsequent to the given sequence of relevant events for Scenario I 
with P(ElIH1) = .85 are depicted in Figure 8. 
Rev. Prob. Graph 
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Figure 8. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario I with P(ElIH1) =.85 
The current economic situation in Cuba precludes the 
justifcation for assigning the occurrence of a Cuban CPE earning 
foreign exchange in excess of $4 billion a high probability. In fact it 
seems Castro himself has accepted this concession. Despite the 
sensitivity at high values of P(E1 I H I ) ,  an assigned probability ranging 
from .05-.65 will not significantly influence a scenario forecast. 
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2. Political Control and a CPE 
The sensitivity of a forecast to the conditional probability of 
political control, P(E3lH1). is analyzed similar to the case of P(ElIH1). 
The ability of the Cuban government to maintain political control 
under a centrally planned economy is now assessed to be higher than 
under a mixed or predominantly market economy. This condition 
alone is sufficient to influence P(MKT), but when combined with an 
increased conditional probability for P(E1 IH1) it significantly affects 
P(CPE) as well. The previously assigned probabilities of Scenario I11 are 
chosen for this example, and a new set of revised probabilities 
calculated. Table 9A lists the prior, conditional and revised 
probabilities, with the amended values for P(E31Hl), P(E31H3) and 
P(ElIE4&E3&H1) appearing in bold italics. 
Rev. Prob. 
j Pwj) P(E31Hj) P(E41E3&Hj) P@llE%&E3&Hj) P(E2IEI&E4&E3&Hj) of Hj 
1 -20 .80 .20 .85 
2 .65 .60 -40 .45 
3 .15 .40 -75 -55 
.25 .144 
.40 -594 
S O  -262 
Table 9 k  Probabilities for Sensitivity Analysis of P(E31H1) and P(E1IH1) 
As before, the revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of 
each event have been recalculated and are listed in Table 9B. 
NONE .200 .650 -150 
E3 .262 .639 .098 
E4 .137 .669 .193 
El .223 .514 .203 
E2 .144 .594 -262 
Table 9B. Revised Probabilities for 
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P(E3IH1) = .80, P(E3IH3) = -40 and P(ElIE4&E3&Hl) = .85 
The sensitivity of the Scenario I11 forecast to P(E31H1) and P(E31H3). 
given a high value for P(ElIHl), is determined by contrasting the values 
for P(MKT) and P(CPE) listed in Table 3A with the new set of revised 
probabilities. Under the above conditions, P(MKT) increases by 74.7%, 
and P(CPE) decreases by only 28% after the sequence of relevant 
events has occurred, this compared to a P(MKT) increase of 207% and 
a P(CPE) decrease of 91% calculated for Scenario 111. The revised 
generalized trends of the Cuban economy subsequent to the given 
sequence of relevant events for Scenario III with P(E31H1) = 30,  P(E31H3) 
= -40 and P(ElIE%&E3&Hl) = .85 are depicted in Figure 9. 
Revised Prob. Graph 
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Figure 9. Revised Graph for Sensitivity Analysis of P(J33IH1) and P(E1lH1) 
The Cuban state security apparatus poses a portentous force to 
any civil opposition. However, as the economic crisis worsens 
increased repression of civil unrest will undoubtedly reach a threshold 
beyond which its effectiveness will be minimal. Furthermore. it is 
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unlikely that a CPE will facilitate the Castro regime in maintaining 
political control as it is defined in Event 3. Arguably in the case of 
Cuba, definite political control is seen to be jeopardized by the 
adoption of free market mechanisms. A predominantly market 
economy operating under lesser economic controls could intensify a 
concurrent appetite of organized opposition for more political 
freedoms. Ascribing high values to P(E3IH1) in the near term cannot be 
readily justified, and the sensitivity of a scenario forecast assigned 
such a conditional probability exceeding 0.60 will prove significant. 
3. The Foreign Exchange Earnings Under a Market Economy 
Each of the scenarios previously examined assesses the foreign 
exchange earning potential of a predominantly market economy 
(MKT) to be significantly higher than either a mixed economy or CPE. 
Consider Scenario I with the condition that Cuban foreign exchange 
earnings exceeding $4 billion is considerably less probable under a 
MKT. In this case, the forecast sensitivity to P(ElIH3), is determined by 
using a lower conditional probability. Listed in Table 1OA are the 
assigned prior, conditional and revised probabilities, with the value for 
P(ElIH3) in bold italics . 
Rev. Prob. 
j Pmj) P(EIIHj) P(E21EI&Hj) P@31E2&EI&Hj) P(UIE3&E2&El&Hj) Of Hj 
1 .20 .05 .35 -70 .10 .003 
2 .65 .45 .55 -80 -65 -904 
3 .15 .10 .75 .90 .85 .093 
............................................................................................................ 
TabIe 10A. Assigned Probabilities with P(EIIH3) = .10 
The revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of each event 
are subsequently recalculated and appear in Table 10B. 
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Event P(CPE) P(M1X) P(MKT) 
NONE .200 .650 .150 
El .03 1 .92 1 .047 
E2 .020 .916 .064 
E3 -017 .911 .072 
E4 -003 .904 .093 
Table IOB. Revised Probabilities for P(ElIH3) = .10 
The sensitivity of the Scenario I forecast to a low value of P(ElIH3), is 
analyzed upon comparing the values for P(MKT) and P(CPE) listed in 
Table 1B with the new set of revised probabilities in Table 10B. Under 
the amended initial condition, P(MKT) decreases by 38%, and P(MIX) 
increases by 39.1% after the sequence of relevant events has occurred, 
this contrasted with a P(MKT) increase of 167% and a P(M1X) decrease 
of 8% previously calculated for Scenario I. The generalized trends of 
the Cuban economy subsequent to the given sequence of relevant 
events for Scenario I with P(ElIH3) = .10 are depicted in Figure 10. 
.............................................................. 
Revised Prob. Graph 
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Figure 10. Revised Probability Graph for Scenario I with P(E1IH3) =.lo 
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Assigning P(E1IH3) a low value relative to P(ElIH1) and P(E1IH2) 
does not accurately reflect the foreign exchange earning potential of a 
predominantly market economy. Associating a relatively higher 
conditional probability to P(E11H3) is justified, given the historic 
inefficiencies of Cuba's CPE and the limited number of autonomous 
export earning enterprises expected to operate in a mixed Cuban 
economy. To overcome forecast sensitivity at low values of P(E1IH3), its 
assigned conditional probability should be greater than 0.55 or the 
difference between P(ElIH3) and both P(E1IH2) and P(EIIH1) at least 0.20. 
4. Pessimistic and Optimistic Probability Judgments 
Sensitivity analysis may also confirm if a scenario forecast is 
influenced by overly optimistic or pessimistic probability judgments of 
a particular event. Consider Scenario I with the condition that Cuban 
foreign exchange earnings exceeding $4 billion are considerably less 
probable under each of the hypotheses: CPE. MIX, and MKT. In this 
example lower assigned values of P(ElIHj), j = 1,2,3; define a pessimistic 
assessment of Event 1. Table 11A list the assigned prior, conditional 
and revised probabilities, with the affected values for P(E1IHj) shown in 
bold italics. 
1 -20 .05 .35 .70 
2 -65 -10 .55 .80 




Table 1 lk Assigned Probabilities for Pessimistic Assessment of El 
The revised probabilities associated with the occurrence of each 
relevant event are subsequently recalculated and appear in Table 11B. 
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Event P(CPE) P(MW P(MKT) *. 
.............................................................. 
NONE .200 .650 -150 
El .lo2 .667 -23 1 
E2 .062 -637 .301 
E3 -053 -618 -328 
E4 -008 .575 -417 
Table 11B. Revised Probabilities for Pessimistic Assessment of El 
For the sake of argument the original conditional probabilities listed in 
Table 1A are considered an  optimistic assessment of Event 1. Under 
the optimistic condition, P(CPE) decreased 99%, P(MIX) decreased 8% 
and P(MKT) increased by 167%, after the complete sequence of events 
had occurred. The revised forecast, incorporating the pessimistic 
probabilities, resulted in P(CPE) decreasing 96%, P(MIX) decreasing 
11.5% and P(MKT) increasing by 178%. The generalized trends of 
the Cuban economy subsequent to the sequence of events for Scenario 
I and a pessimistic assessment of Event 1 appears in Figure 11. 
Revised Prob. Graph 
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Figure 11. Revised Probability Graph for Pessimistic Assessment of El  
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As this example illustrates, sensitivity analysis can be extended 
to establish the sensitivity of a forecast to the "pessimistic/optimistic" 
assessment of a particular event. All assigned conditional probabilities 
specific to the event must be re-evaluated before proceeding with any 
analysis of the revised probabilities. For Scenario I,  a pessimistic 
assessment of El  results in a revised probability over four times higher 
than calculated in the optimistic case for P(CPE) after each event 
occurs. The revised probabilities calculated after the occurence of the 
final event, however, do not appear significantly influenced by the 
quantification of a pessimistic assessment. 
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V. FORECAST RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. FORECASTRESULTS 
The forecast results of Scenario I reveal a sharp increase 
(62.7%) in P(MKT) coinciding with a sharper decline (87.5%) in P(CPE) 
after Cuban foreign exchange earnings exceed $4 billion. As 
subsequent events occur both P(MKT) and P(CPE) continue to increase 
and decrease respectively, but at a much less pronounced rate. The 
differences between the systemic attributes of a CPE and MKT directly 
affect their capacity to achieve the necessary conditions for Event 1. 
I t  is this disparity that accounts for the dramatic divergence between 
P(MKT) and P(CPE) in Scenario I. The probability associated with a 
mixed economy, P(MIX), exhibits a steady decline of only 3%-8% after 
a modest initial increase of 12.4%. Overall, the probabilistic estimate 
of Cuba's economic direction under the conditions for Scenario I 
suggests a steady convergence towards a 60%-40% split between 
P(MIX) and P(MKT) after the sequence of relevant events occurs. 
The forecast results of Scenario I1 essentially parallel those of 
Scenario I, with P(MKT) demonstrating a slightly lower rate of increase. 
The most recent political and economic events in Cuba more closely 
resemble the sequence assumed under Scenario 11, however, the 
revised probabilities calculated for both forecasts are approximately 
the same. 
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The forecast results of Scenario I11 reveal a large displacement 
for both P(MKT) and P(CPE) after the occurrence of Event 4. The 
revised probability for a MKT increases by 69.4% while the revised 
probability of a CPE decreases by 55.1%. The probability associated 
with a MIX exhibits a steady decline of 4%-10% after an initial 
increase of only 1.7%. The facility of implementing economic reforms 
resulting in less centralization under a MKT versus a CPE explains the 
divergence. Such reforms represent a compromise by the Castro 
regime to counter increased civil unrest and preserve political control. 
Of the seven scenarios analyzed, the forecast results of Scenario I11 
offer the closest approximation to a 50%-50% assessment of P(MKT) 
versus P(MIX). 
The forecast results of Scenario IV are similar to those of 
Scenario 111, displaying the most significant probability shift after the 
occurrence of Event 4. In this case, however, marked convergence is 
evident between P(MKT) and P(M1X). The revised probability for a MKT 
increases by 45.2% while the revised probability of a M I X  decreases by 
17.0%. closing the previous gap between the two by 57.2%. The 
revised probability associated with a CPE exhibits an initial decrease of 
94.5%, reflecting its inability to meet import substitution levels 
descriptive of Event 2. The forecast results of Scenario I V  
approximate those of Scenario 111 since the scarcity of basic 
commodities necessary for daily suMval in Cuba could spark the civil 
disobedience and unrest examined under Scenario 111. 
The forecast results of Scenario V consider equal probability of 
the three hypotheses: CPE. MIX,  MKT. The revised probabilities 
93 
immediately diverge from one another with P(MIX) experiencing the 
least change after the sequence of events has occurred, ultimately 
resulting in an approximate 74%-26% split between P(MKT) and 
P(MIX). The dominance of P(MKT) after the sequence of events has 
occurred is not unexpected since the conditions most favorable to 
each event is optimum under a predominantly market economy. 
The forecast results of Scenario VI postulate Cuba's economic 
direction in the medium term. The revised probabilities portray an 
extension of the converging economic trends examined under 
Scenario I. Importantly, the revised probabilities of P(MKT) and P(MIX) 
cross and separate after Event 5, but before the occurrence of Event 6. 
It is at this point that P(MKT) overtakes P(MIX) suggesting the 
likelihood of Cuba integrating into the global economy as a 
predominantly market economy given Events 1 through 6 have 
transpired. 
Similar to the analogy drawn between Scenarios I and 11, the 
forecast results of Scenario VII parallel those of Scenario VI. The 
revised probabilities of Scenario VII depict steady convergence 
between P(MKT) and P(MIX). The probability of a mixed economy, 
however, remains approximately 13 percentage points higher than the 
probability of apredominantly market economy after the sequence of 
events has occurred. Upon initial observation, the forecast results of 
Scenarios VI and VII lend some support to principals advocating the 
continued imposition of the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba as a 
means to bring about a free market economy there. The inferences 
will not be pursued and are beyond the scope of this study. 
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B. CUBA'S ECONOMIC DIRECTION 
The conditions guiding Cuba's economic direction are 
dominated by the Cuban socialist experience, the supremacy of Fidel 
Castro, and the stark isolation which confronts the Cuban economy. 
The course taken by the Cuban economy in the near term is 
conditionally dependent upon reform measures directed at preserving 
the two former conditions and resolving the third. I t  is this 
conditional dependence that lends itself to a Bayesian formulation of 
possible scenarios and a forecast indicative of economic direction. 
The examination of each scenario forecast reveals probabilistic 
outcomes subsequent to a specific sequence of events deemed relevant 
to Cuba's economic future. The juxtaposition of the event order 
represents varying combinations of both economic and political 
priorities critically challenging the Castro regime. Whether taken 
individually or compositely the scenario forecasts suggest either a 
mixed economy or a predominantly market economy as the most 
probable path given the economic challenges ahead. The perpetuation 
or resurrection of a centrally planned economy by the Castro regime 
does not seem practical or probable if economic rationality prevails. 
C. CUBA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
As postulated, the scenario forecasts presented in Chapter IV do 
not explicitly determine the probability of Cuba's economic recovery in 
absolute terms. . Inferred from the Bayesian data analysis is the 
probabilistic response of three hypothetical outcomes to a set of 
conditions that may occur along a path to economic recovery. The 
construction of a Bayesian forecast requires the subjective definition of 
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relevant conditional probabilities, which determine the revised 
probability of an outcome given that an event or sequence of events has 
already happened. A s  defined, Events 1 through 6 establish a 
conceivable set of occurrences marking a path for Cuba's economic 
recovery. The prescribed sequence of events generating each scenario 
is a simple permutation of the event set, whose intent is not to 
exclusively characterize all possible paths, but to allow for analybcal 
balance. The scenario forecasts calculate the revised probabilities of 
each possible outcome (CPE, MIX, MKT), and therefore can be 
interpreted as an updated estimate of outcome consequential to Cuba's 
incremental progress towards favorable economic conditions and 
recovery. 
The economic recovery of Cuba is contingent upon more than 
the occurrence of Events 1 through 6 in any particular order. Other 
target variables such as measured economic growth rates, and 
monetary and fiscal policy reforms are also principal factors to 
consider. A lack of information, however, will complicate the 
translation of these variables into relevant events and make the 
subjective probability assignments increasingly more difficult. For 
example, there may be a time lag between economic successes and the 
actual measured economic growth where essential data has yet to be 
compiled. Cuba's economic recovery presents a slightly different 
problem from estimating the future direction of the Cuban economy. 
Resolution of either conundrum reveals their conditional dependence 
and requires caution to preclude or identify events prejudicial to a 
particular outcome or economic strategy. Events 1 through 6 are 
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justifiable since a different sequence of events less skewed towards 
market reforms, does not accurately portray the events, initiatives and 
debates currently taking place in Cuba. Deduced from the scenario 
forecasts, Cuba may indeed muddle through with a mixed economy, 
but to advance the conditions most favorable for economic recovery 
will warrant a predominantly market economy. 
D. APPLICABILI'R OF BAYESIAN FORECASTING 
Bayesian forecasting proves to be an acceptable method by which 
to explicitly determine the probabilistic outcomes of the Cuban 
economy given the occurrence of a single event or a sequence of 
relevant events. The strength of the analysis lies in the flexibility 
afforded to the forecaster to readjust assigned probabilities as the 
political and economic currents shift in Cuba To incorporate the 
postulations of a different sequence of relevant events or additional 
events, congruent with the dynamics of the Cuban crisis, the 
forecaster need only formalize the associated conditional probabilities. 
The forecast results, derived from the deductive vice inductive 
judgments of the information or evidence available at the time, in 
essence assign a degree of precision to the uncertainty of Cuba's 
economic hture. A sensitivity analysis finalizes the Bayesian forecast 
of the Cuban economy identifying subjective conditional probabilities 
that will considerably affect the scenario forecasts should their values 
vary significantly. The sensitivity analysis also provides the means by 
which to compare Cuba's pessimistic, optimistic, and realistic case 
scenarios. 
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A Bayesian forecast of the Cuban economy is not without its 
shortcomings. Essential to the analysis is a clear definition of the 
relevant events whose translations, from key target variables, risk 
idiosyncratic or situational bias. Such prejudice may be unavoidable if 
complete information is unavailable or existing information suspect. 
In addition, to expand the possible Cuban economic hypotheses 
beyond 3-5 mutually exclusive hybrid classifications would require 
extensive probability computations, most likely aided by computer 
algorithm. 
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APPENDIX A. INTRODUCTION TO BAYES' THEOREM 
The event-composition approach to solving probability problems 
is sometimes facilitated by viewing a sample space S as a union of 
mutually exclusive subsets or hypotheses. That is, if we assume that 
S= H i  U H 2  U U Hk, where Hi n H j  = { } for i f j .  Then any subset E 
of S can be written as 
E =  E n S = E n ( H i U H 2 U I I I U H k )  
= ( E n  H i )  u (E n H2) U U (E n H k )  
We then observe that 
P(E) = P(E n H i )  + P(E n H2) + + P(E n Hk)  
= P(Hi)P(E I H I )  + P(H2)P(E I H2) + i i i + P(Hk)P(E I Hk) 
k 
1= 1 
= C P(Hj)P(EIHj) 
A conditional probability of the form P(Hj I E) can then be evaluated as: 
This formula for conditional probability is known as Bayes' theorem. 
A general formula for the revised probability of any hypothesis 
Hj, when there are "n" events and "m" hypotheses is given by: 
P(Hj I El&E2& ... &En) = 
P[Hj) x P(E1 I Hj) x P(E2 I Hj&El) ... P(En I Hj&El&E2&...&En-l) 
+ P(Hm) x P(E1 I Hm) x P(E2 I Hm&E1) ... P(En I Hm&E1&E2&...&En-l) . 
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AF'PENDIX B. AN EXAMPLE OF HIERARCHICAL INFERENCE 
The following is an example of how hierarchical inference is 
used to calculate the assigned probability of a relevant event. 
Problem: How to incorporate the available data on Cuban nickel 
production and world market prices into the calculation of the 
assigned probability of Cuban foreign exchange earnings exceeding $4 
billion (Event 1) for a predominantly market economy (MKT), under 
the conditions of Scenario VII . 
Solution: The sequence of events for Scenario VII occur in the 
following order: E6-E5-E4-E3-E2-E1, and when combined with the 
hypothesis of a market economy represent the most favorable 
conditions for Cuban nickel production. The data presented in Table 
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From the above data it is assumed that export earnings from sugar, 
tourism, nickel, tobacco, and citrus account for 91 percent of the 
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total. Event 1 stipulates that foreign exchange earnings exceed $4 
billion, which implies that: ($4 bn) x (.91) = $3.64 bn must be earned 
by Cuba's major export oriented sectors listed in Table B1. 
Event 1 is conditionally dependent on sub-events derived from 
the 1990-9 1 average values with slight, justifiable modifications: 
1. sub-event el: Sugar export earnings > $2.885 bn 
(less than average due to the recent decline in sugar harvests) 
2. sub-event e2: Tourism earnings > $ 0.250 bn 
(more than average due to the recent increases in the sector) 
3. sub-event e3: Nickel export earnings > $0.285 bn 
(less than average due to lost CEMA markets) 
4. sub-event e4: Tobacco export earnings > $0.095 bn 
5. sub-event e5: Citrus export earnings > $0.125 bn 
For the purposes of simplicity sub-event e3 is itself assumed to be 
conditionally dependent upon two events, e l  and e2 : 
1. e l  : Cuban nickel production > 45 thousand metric tons 
(this value represents a maximum estimate) 
2. e2: the world price for nickel > $6400/metric ton 
A tabular array of assigned probabilities is constructed, which includes 
the revised probabilities calculated using Bayes' theorem. The results 
are shown in Table B2, with the negation of sub-event e3 (nickel 
export earnings < $0.285 bn) denoted by i53. 
Rev. Prob. 
Prob. P( lel) P( I&el) of Hj 
e3 .30 .55 .45 .64 
&3 .70 .20 -30 .36 
Table B2. Probabilities for Sub-Event e3 
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From the data presented in Table B2 it is clear that the probability of 
Cuban nickel earnings exceeding $0.285 bn has increased to 64% 
(from 30%) given that output production is in excess of 45 thousand 
metric tons and the world price for nickel is greater than $6400 per 
metric ton. This revised probability now becomes an assigned 
probability which is combined with those associated with the other 
sub-events, and Bayes' theorem is again applied to determine the 
revised probability of Event 1. The results appear in Table B3, with 
the negation of Event 1 denoted by El .  
Rev. Prob. 
of Hj Prob. P(le1) P(le2&el) P(le3&e2&el) P(le4& ... &el) P(le5& ... &el) 
El  .15 .79 .68 .64 .57 -55 -80 
El .85 .15 S O  .40 -45 -35 .20 
Table B3. Probabilities for Event 1 
The probability for E l  given that all the sub-events, e l  ... e5, have 
occurred has been revised to .80 as shown above. As the final step in 
the hierarchical inference process, this value is incorporated into the 
asigned probabilities of Scenario VII. I t  appears as P(ElIE2& ... &E6&H3) 
in the seventh column, third row of Table 7A. 
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